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The European Union (EU) set bringing neighbouring countries closer to the European Union 
as a priority. The EU does so by exporting internal rules, values and modes of governance to 
the non-member states, thus exercising external governance. Georgia is one of the target 
countries of the EU’s external governance, withal often being praised for being a frontrunner 
in democracy and good governance development in the region. Despite significant 
developments in the EU-Georgia relations, such as signing Association Agreement, DCFTA and 
visa-free travel, Georgia is not promised membership by the EU. Scholarly literature widely 
argues that none of the other smaller rewards offered by the EU to the non-member countries 
can substitute the membership conditionality, which is crucial for successful external 
governance. This research aims to explain why, despite no membership conditionality, Georgia 
continues to adopt EU standards and meet taken obligation under the Association Agreement.  
This research is based on three analytical approaches—namely, neo-institutionalist, power-
based and domestic structure. Combining them will allow us to analyze the EU based, domestic 
and external variables that affect Georgia’s performance. The paper assesses the degree of the 
EU incentives, Georgian commitment, domestic adoption costs and external, namely Russian 
influence on the Europeanization process in Georgia. The study takes a sector-specific approach 
and looks specifically at three policy areas – trade, energy, and environment. Moreover, the 
thesis takes governance over linkage and leverage as the primary EU’s external governance 
model. 
According to the research results, Georgia demonstrates an adequate level of commitment 
compared to the incentives it is getting from the EU in all three sectors. Similarly, Georgia faces 
medium domestic adoption costs with a slight difference between the trade and energy and less 
politicized environmental policy area. Lastly, Russian leverage in analyzed sectors is low in 
trade and energy and none in the environment. In sum, out of those variables outlined in the 
paper, medium domestic adoption costs combined with the low negative external influence 
could explain why despite no membership conditionality Georgia continues sectoral 
approximation with the EU standards and demonstrates medium commitment in all three 
sectors.  
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As the role of the EU grew in global politics, so did its governance. Today the EU's "external 
governance" assumes exporting its internal rules and models of governance to non-member 
countries and other international organisations. By doing so, the EU contributes to the overall 
process of Europeanization within and outside of the EU borders. 
The Eastern enlargement of the European Union has changed the map of Europe forever. Not 
only the EU acquired new member states, but it got geographically closer to the Eastern 
frontier. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is a joint initiative of the EU and its member states and 
six Eastern neighbours. It is also one of the tools of the European Union to carry out its external 
governance (European Commiss n.d.). Unlike the examples of the EU's external governance in 
Central and Southeastern European countries, in the case of EaP countries, democracy and 
good governance developments are taking place without the highest award the EU can promise 
– membership (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2020). 
Being among six EaP countries, Georgia is often referred to by the EU as the front-runner when 
it comes to democracy development while not having a membership perspective (Civil Society 
Forum 2018). Since the beginning of Georgia-EU relations in 1991-92, there have been several 
significant events that shaped the cooperation between the two sides: Georgia joining the 
European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 and adaptation of EU-Georgia ENP Action Plan in 
2006,  Georgia joining the Eastern Partnership Initiative in 2009, signing the EU-Georgia AA, 
including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area in 2014 which entered into force in 
July 2016, Visa-free travel with the EU that came into force in March 2017, Georgia officially 
becoming a full-fledged contracting party to the Energy Community Treaty in 2017, to name 
the few (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia n.d.). However, Börzel and Schimmelfennig 
(2017) argue that partnerships and AAs cannot substitute the membership conditionality and 
its effect on Europeanization. Conditionality is not part of the plan at the moment between 
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Georgia and the EU. Therefore, different degrees of influencing domestic and external variables 
have to exist to explain the puzzle described above. 
This study aims to explain why, despite not being an EU membership candidate, Georgia 
approximates domestic legislation with that of the EU in individual sectors and advances in 
democracy and good governance development. Furthermore, to test whether a more recent 
good governance promotion model can be successful without a membership perspective, unlike 
the enlargement model. If proved so, it could explain why we see a democracy development in 
Georgia worth praise from the EU, without membership conditionality.  
With the abovementioned puzzle and aim in mind, the main question this research will 
attempt to answer is: 
Q: Why is Georgia a successful example of good governance promotion among EaP without 
having an EU membership perspective? 
As sector-specific details can be overlooked when researching overall democracy development 
and every sector is merely impossible to cover in one research, this paper takes a sectoral 
approach and analyses three sectors in which the EU and Georgia have active cooperation. 
Namely, the trade, environment and energy policy areas.  
This paper will first start by setting the external governance as the main framework as it has 
proven to be a valuable way to capture ways in which the EU supports democratic reforms and 
projects EU rules beyond its borders (Knill and Tosun 2009; Barbé et al. 2009; Schimmelfennig 
and Wagner 2004). Next, the research will go through existing external governance modes and 
primary theoretical explanations such as neo-institutionalist, power-based and domestic 
structure. These analytical approaches are critical because this research will be associated with 
all three of them. By doing so, domestic, EU-based and external factors will be taken into 
account when analysing each sector. Lastly, in the theoretical chapter, it will be argued why 
the governance is a superior analytical mode compared to the linkage and leverage when 
looking at the EU external governance in Georgia, specifically on a sectoral level.  
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After setting a theoretical background for the research, the next chapter will go over the 
existing literature on EU's external governance in countries that achieved the membership and 
current candidate countries. Next, the paper will move to the Eastern Partnership countries as 
none of them have what's referred to as a "golden carrot", i.e. candidacy/membership status 
(Börzel and Lebanidze 2017, 22). Literature Overview chapter will close by overviewing EU-
Georgia relations and argue why analysing the Georgian case on a sectoral level and considering 
variables from different analytical approaches is a viable solution to address existing gaps in the 
Europeanization literature.  
Next, the methodology chapter will explain the research design and methodology applied in 
the research. Firstly, the set of variables and their connection with the analytical modes will 
be discussed, followed by the case and timeframe selection overview. The following section 
will discuss the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the variables and their indicators. 
Lastly, the primary sources and data collection methods will be overviewed in general and for 
each variable.  
Lastly, the Analysis and Research Results chapter will discuss the main findings of the research, 
which will be conducted mainly on a sectoral level. It will address the research question:  Why 
is Georgia a successful example of good governance promotion among EaP without having the 
EU membership perspective?  The study will assess EU incentives offered to Georgia and the 
degree of Georgian commitment to approximate domestic legislation with the EU acquis. 
Furthermore, domestic adoption costs and external Russian influence will be analysed as 
intervening factors. As a result, it will be argued that due to medium size incentives offered by 
the EU, domestic adoption costs being also medium and Russian leverage significantly low, 
especially when compared to the EU, Georgia manages to maintain the medium commitment 




2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to discuss the major concepts of Europeanization, general theoretical and 
analytical concepts in the field, and their limitations. The theoretical framework chapter will 
attempt to justify the framework selection and introduce the main variables of this study. To 
achieve this,  the external governance framework, together with three ideal types - hierarchy, 
market and network mode will be analyzed. They are used to trigger policy changes in target 
countries.  Besides, the research introduces three major theoretical approaches used by scholars 
to explain which mode the EU is following and the major factors influencing the success of the 
external governance or its lack in third countries.  
Lastly, three widely used analytical models that the EU is basing its external democracy 
promotion on will be overviewed. Furthermore, the paper will argue why the governance 
model is superior in Georgia over linkage and leverage. Lastly, the decision to combine 
variables from different analytical approaches will be explained and linked with the limitations 
of the theoretical approach of choice and explain how this paper plans to overcome those 
limitations. 
2.2 External Governance Framework  
Previously, scholars focused on the EU's external relations regarding international trade, aid, 
cooperation as a civilian power or relations with the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) (Lavenex 2004, 682; Duchêne 1973; A. Dimitrova and Dragneva 2009; Hill 1993). 
Studying the role of the EU beyond its member states is a relatively new perspective on the 
role of the EU in international politics. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009)  argue that there 
are two dominant - foreign policy and governance lens when analysing the EU's actions beyond 
its borders. Due to the external relations of the EU often being characterised as transformative, 
scholars explain that external governance is a more appropriate concept than foreign policy as 
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the latter takes countries and regions as the base units of analysis (Schimmelfennig and Wagner 
2004, 658). On the other hand, when viewing EU's external policies through the lens of 
external governance, the focus is on transferring, adopting and implementing rules by using 
different modes of external governance, which will be explained in greater detail below 
(Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 805). 
More recently, the external governance framework has been widely used by scholars of 
Europeanization (Freyburg et al. 2009, 917; Korosteleva 2012, 40). It has proven to be helpful 
to capture ways in which the EU supports democratic reforms and projects EU rules beyond its 
borders. (Youngs 2009, 895). Essentially, it is as Lavenex (2011b, 694) characterises an "inside-
out" approach because the EU is utilising internal solutions to the external problems. It does 
not contribute towards the creation of new rules but rather a rule transfer. This is "a strategic 
attempt to gain control over policy developments" in the neighbourhood as well as 
"benevolently project" its "acquired civilian virtues" to the non-member countries (ibid). 
Contrary to previous frameworks, the main focus of the external governance framework is to 
capture the extension of EU rules and legislations beyond membership or in more recent 
literature beyond candidate countries (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 796). Therefore, the 
country of choice for this research, Georgia and its relations with the EU, fits well in the 
external governance framework for several reasons. Firstly, Georgia is among those countries 
which the EU is transforming through projecting its rules and values (European Commission 
2020b). Secondly, especially with the deepening relations after signing the Association 
Agreement (AA), the EU's transformative power relies on transferring, adopting, and 
implementing rules. Lastly, examining a non-EU member country as my case study makes the 
external governance framework additionally viable. 
2.3 Hierarchy, market, network 
After a general overview of the external governance framework, this section goes through 
external governance modes that the EU relies on to utilise its transformative power and trigger 
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policy change in third countries. These three modes ideal types are - hierarchy, network and 
market (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006, 28). These mechanisms have proven to be a helpful 
tool for analysing ‘macro-level of EU-third-country relations, especially in the cases of EEA, 
ENP or the external governance of individual policy fields (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 
796).  
Firstly, governance through the hierarchy is often applied to the countries with “acquis 
conditionality” and is frequently referred to as a “relationship of domination and 
subordination” (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 797). The asymmetric manner 
characterises the hierarchy mode, i.e. third countries agree to adopt the EU laws because they 
are obliged to do so by supranational law or bilateral agreements with the European Union. 
Therefore, in EU-third-country relations, the hierarchy mode can be attributed to the 
“community method” of policymaking (ibid, 798). Under this mechanism,  national 
governments sacrifice a certain degree of independence to meet the legal obligations (Drezner 
2001, 74). It is the most common approach towards the member states and quasi-members, 
which have agreed to adopt the majority of acquis Communautaire (Knill and Tosun 2009, 678). 
The next mechanism, widely referred to as market governance, is based on economic 
integration and competition between the nation-states. Due to the increased importance of 
market integration in terms of mobility of goods, workers and capital, states are incentivised to 
align their domestic market regulations with the international ones (ibid). Therefore, for 
countries where the EU is the main trading partner, this mechanism is a critical driving force 
to align their domestic regulations with the EU standards (Knill, Tosun And, and Heichel 2008, 
1021).  
The third mechanism of network governance suggests that the domestic changes in the third 
countries are not only driven by the ‘hard route’ of law and money (Knill and Tosun 2009, 
677). It has been demonstrated that network governance significantly impacts transferring 
international policies in individual sectors (Youngs 2009, 898). Also that the European Union 
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favours a hierarchical mode of governance in the third countries to promote democratic change 
(ibid). Candidate countries being the exception for the reasons described above. The main 
reasons behind this are the size of leverage the EU has over third countries, the domestic 
political structures in the target countries and the geopolitical factors (ibid, 900). It has also 
been argued in the example of Balkans, Ukraine and southern Mediterranean countries that 
the EU relies more on the network than a hierarchical mode of governance in general and on 
a sectoral level (Knill and Tosun 2009, 890).  
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig’s (2009, 807) contribution supports the argument of the EU’s 
reliance on the network mode of governance rather than hierarchy when analysing policy 
exports with little difference in the case of EaP.  Some scholars argue that network governance 
is under the  “shadow of hierarchy” (Börzel and Risse 2012, 3). Therefore, despite being 
fundamentally different from the hierarchical model, the network governance does not 
exclude the absence of hegemony or hierarchy to a certain degree (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 807). The EaP regions are the exception due to the additional incentive 
packages that the EU is using in relations with certain EaP countries, such as Georgia, Ukraine 
and Moldova, i.e. the EU is offering positive rewards to the third countries exchange for the 
alignment with the EU rules. For example, in its 11 May 2020 conclusions, the Council of the 
European Union (2020) once again outlined its dedication to the assistance in implementation 
efforts in EaP countries, including financial and expert assistance. More specifically, Georgia 
benefits from several assistant packages. Namely, a reprogramming exercise of part of the 2019 
envelope and the 2020 envelope resulted in an enhanced package of EUR 183 million of grants 
to support Georgia during the COVID-19 crisis (ibid).  EU support is also aimed at ensuring the 
continuation of the implementation of EU related commitments under the AA/DCFTA. 
Additionally, Georgia benefits from the regional response package under the Team Europe 
initiative, which supports the economy in the Eastern Partnership region. (European 
Commission 2016a; 2017a; 2019; 2020a).  More incentives offered to Georgia by the EU will be 
discussed in the empirical chapter. 
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2.4 Theoretical Explanations 
After outlining modes of external governance, the paper moves to three primary theoretical 
explanations in Europeanization: neo-institutionalist explanation, power-based explanation, 
and domestic structure explanation. The main variables tested in this research will be drawn 
from those schools of thought.  
Firstly, the neo-institutionalist framework was primarily developed by March and Olsen (1996; 
2004) and later utilized by Europeanization scholars to analyze European integration impact 
on EU member states and candidate countries (Kakachia, Lebanidze, and Dubovyk 2019). 
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009, 792) argue that the institutionalist framework is "the most 
germane to an external governance approach". Institutionalist explanations assume that the EU 
external governance follows the "internal structures of policy-making within a given domain" 
(ibid, 802).  
There are two main concepts through which the neo-institutionalist approach views the 
process of European integration: Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and Sociological 
Institutionalism (SI), also known as the logic of consequentialism and the logic of 
appropriateness (ibid). Rational Choice Institutionalism assumes that actors make rational 
decisions that maximize their power and welfare. External Incentives Model has been 
developed to explain Europeanisation as an EU driven process based on cost-benefit analysis 
(Kakachia, Lebanidze, and Dubovyk 2019, 452; Schimmelfennig 2007, 7). On the other hand, 
Sociological institutionalism assumes that power and welfare are not the key motivators and 
internalized identities, values, and norms are superior (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a, 
14). "Logic of appropriateness" argues that ideational factors, views of political elites and 
population and their values affect a country's political choices and, therefore, Europeanization 
(Börzel and Risse 2005, 7; Kakachia, Lebanidze, and Dubovyk 2019, 452). 
The institutionalist explanation points out the importance of EU incentives, which will be the 
independent variable of this research. Namely, the reward. Higher the size and speed of reward, 
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legalization and/or legitimacy, higher the effectiveness of the EU external governance (Lavenex 
and Schimmelfennig 2009, 802). This explanation makes the hierarchical mode of governance 
favourable because legalization and legitimacy are higher under hierarchy than network or 
market. Additionally,  international legitimacy, i.e. if alignment with it will automatically align 
the target country's domestic legislation with international rules,  increases the effectiveness 
of external governance. (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b, 19; Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 794). 
Under power-based explanation, the governance mode choice depends on the power of the EU, 
third countries interdependence with the EU and external actors who "provide governance" in 
the region or on the international level. In this case, external structures of power and 
interdependence outweigh EU internal institutions when choosing the preferred external 
governance mode.  Therefore, to include the impact of an external actor, this research will use 
the external actor as one of the two intervening variables. Under power-based explanation, for 
the EU to favour a hierarchical mode of governance, the target country or region needs to 
depend on the EU more than on any other international actor. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 
(2009, 804) argue that market mode will be prioritized in case of high and symmetric 
interdependence. However, symmetric power relations and a medium degree of 
interdependence are suitable conditions for the network governance mode. 
Effectiveness of the External Governance under power-based explanation largely depends on 
the EU bargaining power and interdependence. The highest bargaining power the EU can hold 
is during the accession process when the incentives provided by the EU are the strongest. 
Therefore, the following similarity between the institutionalist and power-based explanations 
can be observed: in both cases, the hierarchical mode of governance is the most effective 
(Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 793; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2020).  
Under domestic structure explanation, the domestic structure of the targeted country or region 
is the driving force when choosing external governance modes and effectiveness. This 
10 
 
explanation assumes that the institutional structures in target countries and international 
governance are compatible with each other. The core elements of the domestic explanation are 
the administrative capacity of the target state, costs of adoption, veto players, and the domestic 
resonance of EU-promoted rules. Independent and intervening variables of this research will 
be drawn from the domestic structure explanation. Namely, the commitment of Georgia to 
approximate domestic legislation with the EU acquis will be a dependent variable. On the other 
hand, domestic adoption costs will include both veto players and the administrative capacity 
of a target country - intervening variable (Barbé et al. 2009, 837; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 
2009, 804). 
2.5 Analytical models of Linkage, Leverage and Governance 
There are three major analytical models that the EU's external democracy promotion has been 
based on. Namely, linkage, leverage and the most recent one -  governance model (Lavenexa 
and Schimmelfennig 2011, 888). These analytical models are closely linked with the modes of 
Europeanisation outlined above. Namely, a hierarchical form of external governance can 
mainly be observed with the leverage analytical model and the practical model connected to it 
- the enlargement model. On the other hand, due to the smaller size of leverage over non-
candidate countries compared to the candidates, the EU prefers the network form of 
governance in the Governance model (Youngs 2009, 901).  
There are two main aspects of the linkage model - "direct" democracy promotion, which is 
addressed to democratic civil society and political opposition groups. The "Direct" pillar of the 
linkage can be material as well as educational (Lavenexa and Schimmelfennig 2011, 890). 
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (ibid) assume that the more direct support the EU demonstrates 
towards pro-democratic forces in the target country, the higher the effectiveness of linkage 
(ibid). On the other hand, the "indirect" pillar is of a more long-term nature. It is based on the 
modernization theory, which assumes that economic development is at the core of better 
education, functioning middle class and less poverty, i.e. "The more well-to-do a nation, the 
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greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (ibid, 897). There are several ways the EU 
can achieve this,  such as intensified trade relations, increased investments and development 
aid.  Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (ibid) assume that for the higher success of "indirect" 
leverage, the EU needs to increase the trade, aid and investments in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors of the economy so that it reaches the general population, rather than the elites. Another 
tool the EU can use is to increase the support for education in the garget country by funding 
educational programs, building facilities, training teachers, etc. (ibid).  
According to the leverage, the target is the domestic government of the third country rather 
than civil society (ibid, 893). As the leverage analytical model is a top-down strategy and 
promotes democratic changes in state institutions, and does not trigger immediate changes in 
a civic culture or public sphere, the assumption is that even if the leverage model is successful, 
it will be so in a formally functioning democracy. Equal success on the lower level of 
democratic culture is not guaranteed (ibid, 892). To promote institutional reforms in the target 
country, the EU often utilized conditionality. In the case of the EU, external governance is the 
bargaining process between the EU and the third state (ibid, 900). When applying 
conditionality, the EU sets the adaptation of democratic institutions as conditions for the 
rewards. Scholars split into tangible (material and political) and intangible (social or symbolic). 
These rewards can include political support, financial and technical assistance, trade and AAs 
and the "golden carrot" – membership (ibid, 902). Size, speed of rewards and credibility are 
among the important variables that determine the effectiveness of the leverage model. (ibid, 
903; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2020, 817). 
In sum, the favourable conditions for the effectiveness of the leverage model include the cases 
where the interdependence between the EU and the third country is in favour of the EU. In 
contrast, the size, speed, credibility of rewards and determinacy of conditions remain high, and 
the domestic political costs for the third country's government remain relatively low (ibid). 
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The practical implications of the "leverage" analytical model can be seen when looking at the 
enlargement model of external governance. The enlargement model is the most effective model 
of external governance and has been praised by the European Commission as the EU's most 
successful foreign policy (European Commission 2003, 5). However, with the conditions for 
the ENP countries and the subject of my case study being different, for example, from those 
during the eastern enlargement wave,  increased "enlargement fatigue" and decreased number 
of countries eligible for the membership, scholars started to shift their interest from leverage 
and enlargement models to more viable alternatives for the region (Börzel, Dimitrova, and 
Schimmelfennig 2017, 157). 
Starting from the early 2000s, before the CEE wave of enlargement, scholarly literature mainly 
focused primarily on leverage and linkage models of governance. Studies have suggested that 
membership conditionality, unlike socialization strategies or the use of weaker incentives, has 
been a useful tool to help Centra and Eastern European countries achieve significant democracy 
development and align domestic legislation with the EU acquis (Lavenexa and Schimmelfennig 
2011, 898).  The examples of Slovakia in the 1990s and Yugoslavia until 2000 has demonstrated 
that even "the golden carrot" fails to achieve its goal when the government in the target country 
refuses to step down and fights for political survival (ibid). Because the EU does not show the 
readiness to extend membership perspective beyond current candidate countries, Kubicek 
(2011) has argued that membership incentives will not be as powerful for those countries who 
are willing to apply as it was in the case of CEE countries. The second reason that makes the 
leverage model less viable is that the empirical evidence of political conditionality without 
accession conditionality has proven to be inconsistent (Lavenexa and Schimmelfennig 2011, 
899).  Lastly, the domestic factors in the "European Neighbourhood" has made the leverage 
model unfavourable. Most of the states in the region are run by autocratic regimes, for which 
even the EU's political conditionality will pose a threat. All three of these factors make the 
most successful EU strategy for democracy promotion - enlargement, unpopular choice in the 
EU's close neighbourhood (ibid). 
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Similar to the leverage model, linkage did not get much praise from scholars in the case of ENP. 
Domestic regimes and geographic proximity to the EU serves against the linkage model 
(Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008b, 193). Autocratic regimes tend to translate the EU's direct 
linkage as unlawful interference in their domestic affairs. Those states regard the EU's actions 
as driven by purely economic or strategic interest. 
Due to the criticism towards the linkage and leverage models, more recent studies on the 
Europeanization of nonmember states have utilized the "governance" analytical model, which 
borrows some aspects from both "linkage" and "leverage" models described above (Lavenexa 
and Schimmelfennig 2011, 895). The "governance" model pushes forward the elements of 
democratic governance through sectoral corporations and agreements between the EU and the 
public administration of the target countries rather than focusing on strengthening more 
general democratic institutions such as elections and parliaments (Beetham 1999, 4–5). 
Principles on which the "governance" model focuses are often stated as transparency, 
accountability and participation (Lavenexa and Schimmelfennig 2011, 895). Transparency 
implies how accessible and available for the general public is the information about the decision 
making. Accountability refers to the public officials being obliged to answer for the decisions 
they make. And lastly, participation is about non-state actors being involved in the 
administrative decision and policy-making (ibid, 896). 
Lavenex (2011a, 952)  found that network governance is especially effective in the sectors that 
are more technocratic and less politicized, such as transboundary water management and air 
transport, as an example. Another important factor identified by Lavenex was the government 
capacity that influenced the ability of third countries to participate as equal partners. On the 
model of specifically ENP countries, it has also been proven that the EU is more focused on the 
approximation of nonmember countries to the EU norms and practices rather than entirely 
exporting the acquis (ibid). Therefore, it is argued that the EU external governance promotes 
democratic governance by exposing non-candidate countries to the acquis at the sectoral level. 
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However, the "Governance" model fits with the institutionalist approach but considers sector-
specific and domestic conditions in the target country. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009, 
796) argue that the main trigger of the "governance" model is based on socialization. However, 
conditionality also plays a role. 
There are similarities between the enlargement and governance models (Lavenexa and 
Schimmelfennig 2011). Like "democratic conditionality", the EU promotes human rights and 
liberal democracy under the governance model. On the other hand, similar to "acquis 
conditionality", the EU promotes applying the EU legislation into the domestic politics of 
nonmember countries. The study by Sasse (2008)  pointed out interesting similarities between 
the EU-ENP and EU-candidate countries' relations. Namely, she underlines common points 
between the bilateral action Plans between the EU and the ENP countries and the Accession 
Partnerships with the candidate countries. Commission's ENP Country Reports and the 
Commission's Opinions on potential candidate countries and ENP Progress Reports and 
Commission's Regular Reports on candidate countries. However, the key difference is the 
absence of membership perspective (Baltag and Romanyshyn 2011, 5).  To compensate for the 
lack of membership perspective, the EU uses different incentives such as the AAs, DCFTA, 
financial support, Visa Free travels,  closer trade partnerships, etc. Therefore, due to the lack 
of strong incentives, the EU largely depends on rule transfer and the "soft" mechanisms (ibid). 
The governance model relies on network forms of interaction rather than hierarchical.  The 
latter can be primarily observed in the enlargement model (Youngs 2009; Freyburg et al. 2009). 
Youngs (2009, 905) argues that the EU has less leverage over non-candidate countries than the 
candidate supports his argument as to why the EU leans towards network governance rather 
than hierarchical.  
There are several variables such as  the degree of legal specification in the EU acquis and other 
international treaties, that affect the success of the "governance" model. The relation between 
the success and the variables is that the higher the legal specification in both EU acquis and the 
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international treaties that the target country is part of, the more successful the socialization 
process (Lavenexa and Schimmelfennig 2011, 896). The second variable is the 
transgovernmental interactions. The assumption is that the more the interactions are on the 
level of transgovernmental networks, the higher the level of effectiveness that the norms will 
be transferred to the target country (ibid, 897). Another important variable that is part of not 
only "Governance" but various other models is adoption costs and interdependence with the 
EU and the target country.   The overall assumption is that the success of rule transfer decreases 
with higher adoption costs and less interdependence with the EU in the respective sector (ibid). 
Lastly, similar to the "linkage" model, in the case of the "governance" model, openness and 
autonomy of administrations in third countries remain an important factor that influences the 
effectiveness. More specifically, the effectiveness of the good governance promotion is higher 
in those cases where the autonomy and accessibility of the administration in the target country 
are high.  
In sum, scholars agree that the "leverage" model has reached its limits in ENP countries. 
Variables such as high political costs,  low consistency, determinacy and credibility from the 
EU's side are not favourable conditions for the effectiveness of the "leverage" model. The 
empirical evidence shows that the efficacy of "conditionality-lite" described by Sasse (2008, 
296) is relatively limited. Similar to that, there is not much scholarly evidence that would 
demonstrate that the "linkage" model is a viable alternative to the previously successful 
enlargement model (Lavenexa and Schimmelfennig 2011, 903). Regarding the EU policy-
making, the governance approach to Europeanization has proven to be a viable alternative to 
the established integration theory when analyzing Union's relations with the non-candidate 
states. The governance model "focuses on the democratization potential of transgovernmental 
functional cooperation in individual sectors" (Schimmelfennig and Wagner 2004). 
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2.6 Preferred mode and application of theoretical approach 
After analysing a wide range of theoretical approaches and modes that explain the success of 
the EU's external governance under various conditions, the question is which one is the most 
suitable for this case study. This paper will adopt the practice utilised by Barbe' et al. (2009, 
835), which combines variables characteristic for multiple analytical approaches.  
Firstly, the choice of analytical governance model over linkage and leverage was a 
straightforward one as the scholarly literature argues about more favourable conditions for 
governance model than linkage and leverage, with the latter reaching its limits in the ENP. In 
addition, the governance model, similar to this research, is adopting a sectoral approach. 
Moving to the governance modes, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009, 807) argue that there 
is a "tendency to rely upon more networked forms of coordination". However, more recently, 
scholars challenged this approach with the argument that currently, in many cases, including 
EU-Georgian relations, network governance remains in the "shadow of hierarchy" (Heritier 
2002, 11; Delcour 2013, 352). Despite Georgia not having 'acquis conditionality", it has legal 
obligations to achieve an approximation of the rules in different policy sectors undersigned AA 
and DCFTA. Especially when looking at the negotiations for the DCFTA and visa liberalisation, 
Georgia had to adopt specific, predetermined rules associated with conditionality to meet the 
demands. This is reflected in the preamble of the EU-Georgia AA. Although it is delivered in 
the form of a package of beneficial rules for Georgia, which they are, the negotiations are 
nevertheless asymmetrical (Tsuladze et al. 2016). That is a clear indication of the hierarchical 
mode. On the other hand, adopting a number of those rules, especially the ones outlined under 
DCFTA, would mean a greater degree of access to the EU market.  This bears greater 
importance for Georgia as the EU is Georgia's main trading partner, accounting for 27% of its 
total trade (geostat.ge). 
Therefore, incentives and variables envisaged under market mode should not be ignored. This 
argument can be strengthened by looking at the key policy instruments under the EaP, the 
actors involved in them and the underlying mechanisms (see Appendix 1). It further proves 
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that the EU's relations with the EaP member states is not limited to a single type of interaction 
but instead utilises a mix of different practices such as conditionality based upon legal 
convergence, assistance and socialisation. 
The selected variables are drawn from all three analytical approaches outlined above—namely, 
the neo-institutionalist, power-based, and domestic structure. More specifically, the size and 
credibility of rewards the EU is offering Georgia are characteristic of the neo-institutionalist 
approach. On the other hand, the domestic factors approach focuses on the commitment of the 
target country and various domestic adoption costs (veto players, administrative capacity, 
financial costs). However, the power-based explanation is structured around the variables such 
as the EU’s bargaining power which is largely determined by the interdependence between the 
EU and Georgia compared to external actors and Georgia. By choosing these sets of variables, 
the research will not be limited to only one analytical approach as well as address the number 
of limitations connected with the different modes of the EU external governance, which will 
be discussed below. 
2.7 Limitations of the external governance 
There are a number of limitations connected with the use of external governance framework 
and governance model in Europeanization literature. Below will be the overview of general 
limitations of external governance as a concept, a discussion of the implications of those 
framework's shortcomings on this research specifically and scholarly criticism on the 
governance model.   
Firstly, as Gänzle (2008, 5) argues, the limitation of the EU external governance is in not 
treating third countries as equals and limiting their opportunities to learn in the coordinating 
system. As described above, by making external governance about utilising internal solutions 
to external problems, the EU does not look "outside the system" (ibid). This makes external 
governance about "injecting" learning into the target countries in order to get them closer to 
the EU's vision of order. 
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Another fundamental constraint that  Korosteleva (2012, 55) points out is overlooking the 
boundaries of target countries when constructing its own boundaries. According to her, the 
external governance pays little to no attention to the two-sided process that is boundary 
shaping and calls the EU a subject as well as "the object of boundary-building itself" (ibid).    
Therefore, the EU mistreats others not as members of the club but rather objects that should 
be made like the EU itself.  To sum Korosteleva's (ibid, 56) arguments, the EU relations with 
third countries, rather than being based on the notion of partnership, remains largely one-
sided. 
Next, as Albi (2009 as cited in Korosteleva 2012, 56) argues, external governance is 
characterised as projecting weak normative consistency and lacking multi-level consensus.  
Occasionally, it contradicts the institutional settings of the respective counterparts within the 
EU. The capacity of the external governance also comes under question when analysing the 
rule transfer of macro policies such as political acquis and pushing countries towards long-term 
commitment. Korosteleva (2012, 52) argues that as the nature of governance is evolving, it is 
constantly searching for more suitable ways of coordination between the EU and the target 
countries or regions. 
Additionally, scholars outline the structural deficiencies of external governance such as the EU 
institutions, which are known to be rigid, hierarchical and bureaucratic while not taking into 
account the domestic structures of the target countries and their capacities to effectively absorb 
the norms and values that are being projected at them (Freyburg et al. 2009, 792; Korosteleva 
2012, 49).  Dimitrova and Dragneva (2009)  point out the issue of interdependence. Especially 
in the close neighbourhood, the interdependence of the third countries, not only on the EU 
but on Russia, should be getting sufficient attention. The reason is that the interests and the 
values both Russia and the EU are spreading in the region often contradict each other. 
There are certain shortcomings connected with the sectoral approach of the governance model. 
Namely, scholars agree that analysing rule transfer and improvement in democratic governance 
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in particular sectors can not substitute "democratic transformation proper" and are "only a small 
drop in the ocean of institutional provisions constituting a democratic order" (Freyburg et al. 
2011, 1029). Moreover, often the effectiveness of external governance is limited to micro-
management, especially in technical sectors, where the rule transfer is less a result of 
convergence but more seen as a benefit for the target countries and domestic actors. 
(Korosteleva 2012, 51; Whitman 2010; Bauer, Knill, and Pitschel 2007). 
There is a number of ways to address these limitations. Regarding the overemphasising rule 
adoption in individual sectors, even adopting elements of good governance and exposing 
individual sectors to the EU acquis requires the transformation power of the EU. Therefore it 
promotes good governance "in those countries where such traditions are lacking" and brings 
the target state one step closer to the EU standards. Power-based explanation adds the factor of 
external actors to the equation. Thus the interdependence on powers other than the EU is not 
being overlooked. Academics point out the general shift in external governance during the past 
decade to counteract other limitations. Namely, "The new governance" is more horizontal, 
rather than relying solely on hierarchical settings. By mixing different modes of governance, 
the rule transfer has become more participatory and does not fully remove but rather blurs the 
boundaries between the subject and object (Korosteleva 2012, 50). 
This research addresses those limitations the following way:  the selection of variables from 
different theoretical explanations will be useful to analyse the aspects of EU-third country 
relations that often get overlooked. Namely, by taking into account domestic, EU-based as well 
as external factors, interdependence with other powers, domestic factors that affect EU's 
external governance and EU's tendency not to "look outside the system" will be put under the 
spotlight. This research will not try to explain the weakness of external governance in terms of 
macro policies, nor does it exclude the presence of other variables that could have an impact 
on EU's external governance.  But rather, it takes individual sectors as a level of analysis and 





This chapter served as an overview of all the important theoretical and analytical concepts 
relevant to this research. It started with the large notion of external governance with the three 
modes used by the European Union for rule transfer and domestic change in third countries. 
Analysis of existing scholarly literature showed that basing the argument solely on one of the 
three modes would greatly limit the scope of research, as the EU utilizes all three of them to a 
different degree.  
Following the path of Barbe et al. has been chosen as the most appropriate way to capture 
different influencing factors. Therefore, the research will not be limited to only one analytical 
approach but rather combining variables from different approaches. Lastly, the application of 
the existing theoretical concepts has been explained, together with the criticism the external 
governance framework has received due to its limitations from scholars (Heritier 2002; 













3. Literature Overview 
3.1 Introduction 
This study aims to explain why, despite the absence of membership conditionality, Georgia is 
adopting EU rules and regulations, aligns its domestic legislation with the acquis 
communautaire and, as a result, deserves to be addressed by The European Commission as a 
frontrunner in democracy development among ENP countries (Civil Society Forum 2018). It is 
important to look at those countries who have already gone through EU membership candidacy 
and eventually membership to achieve this aim. Those states who, similarly to Georgia, are part 
of Eastern Partnership. This chapter will begin with an overview of existing literature on the 
European Union’s external governance with membership conditionality.  Next, empirical 
evidence on the Eastern Partnership member states will be analyzed as an example of the 
external governance with the absence of “golden carrot” as an incentive to carry out democratic 
reforms on a domestic level. The following chapter will also include the overview of the EU-
Georgia relations and serve as a case study description. Lastly, the gap in existing literature will 
be outlined, especially regarding paying little attention to the external players and integration 
processes other than European integration. It will be argued why the attempt to fill in the gap 
by taking external actors into account is essential when analyzing EU-third country relations 
while keeping domestic and EU based factors into the equation. 
3.2 EU External Governance 
Despite the EU not being a state by itself, the Union has operated within a defined territory 
delimited by the member states. As the European Union developed as a political system of its 
own, its presence in international politics and domestic politics increased. Michael Smith 
(1996, 5) characterized this change as a shift from the “politics of exclusion” to the “politics of 
inclusion”. 
The politics of exclusion was a cultural, territorial, legal and institutional integration between 
the western European states. Under the “politics of inclusion”, those boundaries are more 
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blurred, and the geographical division is more flexible (Smith 1996, 23). Intensified influence 
the EU has on the countries beyond its borders, including projecting acquis communautaire 
beyond the member states, proves that. 
Development in the role of the EU has been referred to as “Europeanization”. The concept is 
defined as a domestic impact of the European Union and as a “process in which states adopt EU 
rules” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b, chap. One; 2020). Another term widely used to 
describe a way for the European Union to extend its rules on non-member states is External 
Governance (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 796). The concept of external governance 
first was used in relation to the eastern and the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) in the 
Black Sea Region  (Friis and Murphy 1999; Filtenborg, Gänzle, and Johansson Elisabeth 2002; 
Myrjord 2003). Lavenex (Lavenex 2004) argues that the crucial component of external 
governance is “the extension of the legal boundary of authority beyond institutional 
integration”, which means that when the EU is exercising external governance, third countries 
are aligning their domestic rules and regulations with parts of the acquis communautaire 
(Lavenex 2004; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).   
There are common patterns when analyzing empirical data from different countries and 
regions. One of the key elements is that external governance often follows a sectoral, policy-
specific logic rather than macro-institutional prerogatives (Lavenex, Lehmkuhl, and 
Wichmann 2009; Barbé et al. 2009; A. Dimitrova and Dragneva 2009). However, what remains 
more constant is that the EU prefers a networked mode of external governance over 
hierarchical. Studies by Levenex et al. (2009) and Youngs (2009) argue that the network mode 
is preferred both on sectoral policies and democracy promotion. Looking more specifically at 
the ENP countries, the EU favours promoting approximation to the EU norms and practices 
rather than copying acquis entirely. Furthermore, the EU does not make a consistent effort to 
promote bringing the democratic change on a macro-policy level but instead chooses to 




Regarding institutionalist and power-based theories, existing literature finds evidence for the 
hypotheses from both theoretical approaches. The institutionalist/Neo-institutionalist 
approach finds support in the works of Barbé et al. (2009), Freyburg et al. (2009), Kakachia et 
al. (2019), while scholars like Youngs (2009, 901) and Dimitrova and Dragneva  (2009) argue 
that the bargaining power and constellations of interdependence can be used as a potential 
concept to explain the different mode of governance in the democracy promotion. 
3.3 Empirical evidence from member and candidate countries 
As mentioned above, the frameworks for analyzing external governance vary depending on the 
case studies, whether the country has a membership conditionality or not, etc. The main 
framework used to explain if and under which conditions the EU conditionality leads to 
domestic change is the External Incentives Model (EIM)(Schimmelfennig et al. 2011, 663; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a, 10). 
EIM was extensively tested on the example of CEE countries. Overall, conditions were highly 
favourable during the CEE pre-accession period (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2020, 828). 
Rewards promised by the EU were high as well as credible. More specifically, during the post-
accession period, the EU used the highest award – membership (ibid, 819). Although high 
political costs were observed in some instances, the power of the “golden carrot” was enough 
to outweigh them (ibid, 829). 
On the other hand, EIM partly explains the patterns observed in the CEE countries after the 
EU membership. Namely, it was expected that new member states would lag behind the old 
ones in compliance with the acquis as they no longer had the membership reward. However, 
the data showed the opposite. CEE member states outperformed many older member states 
overall and in specific policy areas (ibid, 821). There are several patterns in compliance of CEE 
countries to the EU conditionality. Namely, smaller countries of the CEE kept advancing with 
domestic legislation with the EU one. Poland, on the other hand, was lagging (ibid). Börzel et 
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al.’s (2010) argument that smaller countries are more concerned with the reputational costs of 
non-compliance than the larger is used by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier(ibid, 821).  
When examining SEE countries, differences alongside similar patterns can be observed. The 
EU decided to take an individual approach towards the Western Balkan countries, i.e. less 
compliant countries could not hide behind the frontrunners in the region (ibid, 827). One of 
the differences between the CEE and Western Balkans pre-accession period is that the EU’s 
external governance in the Western Balkans is led by the intention to put security, peace-
building and stability above democracy promotion (Richter 2012, 514). Additionally, empirical 
evidence shows that the reward offered by the EU to CEE countries during the pre-accession 
period and currently to the SEE countries are the same – membership (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2020, 826). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir (ibid, 827) argue that despite the high 
credibility of the threat to withhold the reward, the difference between the CEE and SEE rises 
when comparing the credibility of EU’s membership promise, which has weakened in the case 
of SEE. This is especially true in the case of Turkey, which is the least preferred potential 
member among the candidate countries (ibid, 828). 
3.4 Empirical Evidence from Eastern Partnership 
The most effective model of external governance and projection acquis to non-member states 
is enlargement praised by the European Commission as the EU’s most successful foreign policy 
(European Commission 2003, 5). Therefore, scholarly literature has initially been sceptical 
about the ability of European neighbourhood policy to trigger tangible political change and 
policy diffusion. This argument has been used to explain why most of the ENP members were 
not eager to undertake domestic reforms (Lavenex 2011a, 938; Kelley 2006, 36). However, over 
time more academic work shifted from the traditional “conditionality framework” to relatively 
under-researched models, where we can observe “a roof over an expanding system of 




As the ENP is about “everything but institutions”, the EU has offered other incentives at its 
disposal, such as access to the internal market, visa liberalisation, financial aid, etc. (Börzel and 
Lebanidze 2017, 18). Sixteen years after European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was 
established, the EU is still mostly surrounded by authoritarian regimes and failed states. 
However, democratic conditionality is still successful in the ENP where applied consistently 
(Börzel and Lebanidze 2017, 18). Eastern Partnership countries are a good representation of 
this argument. For example, external pressure was vital for successful  “Color Revolutions” in 
Georgia and Ukraine (ibid, 19). It was further proven to be the case in 2010 when Brussels was 
more determined to support democratic reforms in Ukraine, which already was a member of 
the Eastern Partnership. The EU used the AA negotiations and ratification conditions on 
specific demands (European Commission 2013). Although the former Ukrainian government 
refused the offered terms and conditions, the large wave of protests, widely known as 
“Euromaidan”, forced President Yanukovych to flee the country (Börzel and Lebanidze 2017, 
26).  Similarly, in the case of Moldova, the EU put a consistent effort to support pro-European 
political forces while freezing financial assistance to Moldova because of the corruption scandal 
involving Moldova’s politicians (European Comission 2019). Recent European Commission 
reports praise Moldova for implementing key reforms, strengthening democratic standards and 
the rule of law and moving forward in implementing the EU-Moldova AA (ibid). 
Unlike Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, the EU has not applied democratic conditionality 
consistently in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although Azerbaijan has often been the subject of 
criticism over the lack of democratic reforms and the rule of law, the EU not only refrained 
from imposing financial sanctions but intensified its energy and trade relations with 
Azerbaijan(Börzel and Lebanidze 2017, 25). Similarly to Azerbaijan, the EU never made 
financial assistance to Armenia as a condition to incentivise political reforms.  
The only case that does not follow the pattern explained above is Belarus, where despite the 
presence of democratic conditionality, the attempt of the EU to trigger democratic reform 
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failed1. The EU used several tools it had. Namely, it applied democratic conditionality, 
introduced a wide range of sanctions against “Europe’s Last Dictator”, applied diplomatic and 
political pressure; however, the attempts proved ineffective (Reuters 2012; Börzel and 
Lebanidze 2017). Authors such as Ambrosio and Tolstrup explain this phenomenon by several 
factors such as external players, namely Russia, that remains the largest supporter of 
Lukashenko’s regime (as cited in Börzel and Lebanidze 2017, 20). Additionally, the political 
elite that was the target for strict sanctions benefited from the financial aid by other 
international financial institutions, especially during the global financial crisis in 2007-2008 
and strengthened Lukashenko’s regime. 
 
3.5 EU External Governance in Georgia - Case Study Description 
To analyze the different tools and modes of foreign policy the EU is utilizing in relations with 
Georgia, how the recipient country reacts to them, and the role of major external forces, this 
part starts with a brief overview of the EU-Georgia relations overtime. Followed by the 
discussion of Georgia's political and economic integration with the EU and other major external 
regional actors. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Georgia,  EU-Georgia relations 
were focused on humanitarian help, conflict management and nuclear safety. They did not 
include specific long-term goals (Rommens 2017, 116). This was due to the perception of the 
South Caucasus by the west in the 1990s as an unstable region with emerging ethnic conflicts 
in the failing states. It took five years after Georgian independence for the two sides to engage 
in a standardized format of relations when in 1996 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) was signed. PCA, which entered into force in 1999, was the primary legal basis for the 
 
 
1 In the end of June Belarus said that it was "suspending its participation in the EU's Eastern Partnership. However, 
because the events are still unfolding at the time of writing  the paper, they have not been included in the thesis. 
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bilateral relations between the two sides until 2016 when the AA (AA) was signed (ibid). The 
PCA did not include specific policies to support democracy or civil society but instead focused 
on sectoral cooperation (trade, economic, energy, legislative, cultural, etc.) and covered 
necessary tools to facilitate political dialogue (ibid). The absence of explicit guidelines for 
democracy promotion was partly balanced by introducing the European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in 1999 (Eur-Lex 2000). 
Although not part of the ENP at the earlier level of drafting, Georgia became a member after 
the Rose Revolution in 2003. The aim of the ENP is officially declared as to offer policy member 
states deeper economic integration and political association, increase mobility and enhance 
people-to-people contacts with the absence of membership perspective (European Commiss 
2004). Based on this, two sides drafted the Action Plan, the implementation of which was 
monitored through annual progress reports(European Council 2006). The ENP, as promised by 
the then president of the European Commission, Romano  Prodi (2002), offered "everything 
but institutions" and contributed to strengthening the political framework based on already 
existing institutions, most of which were shaped during the intensified bilateral cooperation 
under PCA.   
2009 marked a significant year in the EU-Georgia relations as the Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
was introduced. It was preceded by two milestones for Georgia that greatly influenced the 
future relations between the two sides.  The first one being the NATO Bucharest summit in 
2008, during which Georgia received a promise that, together with Ukraine, they will 
eventually become a NATO member country (North Atlantic Council 2008). The second 
significant event was the Russo-Georgia war that left two of the country's regions occupied by 
Russian forces. The Georgian government put NATO membership in front of EU integration 
(Chkhikvadze 2019, 58). The vagueness of the ENP also fueled the lack of enthusiasm towards 
EU integration. Georgian government officials have expressed that the ENP Action Plan signed 
in 2006 did not introduce any new priorities that would bring tangible benefits to the Georgian 
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population (ibid). Moreover, the European Union was not interested in updating the PCA, 
which was the only legally binding document, signed back in 1996. 
After the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the interest and the presence of the EU in Georgia 
increased significantly. In particular, Nicolas Sarkozy, the president of France, who held the 
EU presidency, mediated a six-point ceasefire agreement in August 2008 (Reliefweb 2008). The 
EU played an essential role in supporting Georgia's non-recognition policy of occupied regions. 
Moreover, it organized a donor's conference in October 2008, where $4.5 billion was raised for 
post-war rehabilitation. Furthermore, the EU established European Union Monitoring Mission 
(EUMM) to Georgia, which aimed to monitor compliance with the six-point-agreement (ibid). 
After the events described above, the Georgian government decided to put intensifying 
relations with the EU on the agenda. President Saakashvili openly declared that "joining the 
European Union is more important to Tbilisi than being part of NATO since entering Europe 
is like coming home" (Civil Georgia 2009).  Simultaneously,  The EaP expanded the EU's offers 
to the Eastern neighbours and "proposed accelerating political association and further 
economic integration" (Council Of The European Union 2009, 6). Unlike ENP and Action Plan, 
EaP promised tangible benefits to Georgia.  Among the major incentives listed in the Joint 
Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership summit were "political association and further 
economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries" together 
with "supporting mobility of citizens and visa liberalization in a secure environment" (ibid, 7). 
The EaP offered two formats: bilateral and multilateral dimensions. Both former and current 
governments of Georgia favoured bilateral over multilateral. The aim of Georgian leadership 
from the beginning of the EaP programme was to become a successful example among the EaP 
countries, get the benefits from the EU in return and focus on a somewhat distant membership 
perspective (Chkhikvadze 2019, 61; Lebanidze 2017, 1). 
EaP brought changes in the bilateral relations of the EU and the EaP member states, such as 
increased financial support from the EU followed by the increased responsibilities from the 
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EaP member states. To benefit from the rewards offered by the EU, Georgia had to meet the 
demands in the areas of visa regulations and trade integration (Rommens 2017, 116). On the 
other hand, AAs (AAs) and the deep and comprehensive free-trade areas (DCFTAs) were aimed 
at creating "a strong political bond and promote further convergence by establishing a closer 
link to EU regulation and standards" (European Commission 2008, 3).  
Since 2009, the EaP has been the main force behind the implemented reforms in Georgia. Even 
before the AA entered into force, the EaP and the negotiations for the DCFTA served as an 
incentive for Georgia to introduce specific regulations that would bring the country closer to 
the EU standards (Chkhikvadze 2019, 61). Georgia started AA negotiations during Saakashvili's 
administration, and the process was finalized during the Georgian Dream coalition. 
Harmonizing Georgian legislation and standards with those of the EU turned out to be a 
difficult task. During the negotiation period, the Georgian government's strategy was to 
introduce only the necessary regulations and continue the deregulation policy where possible 
(ibid, 62). 
AA, which entered into force on 1 July 2016, covers a wide range of areas and, unlike the ENP 
AP, directly impacts citizens' lives. Overall, alignment with the regulations is a costly and 
lengthy process. Experts argue that the benefits won't be felt overnight. Similarly, the benefits 
of the DCFTA are expected in the long run. Analysis of current trends proves that the results 
vary depending on the sector (ibid). Five years on, the AA has not yet managed to make 
significant changes in the most concerning unemployment and poverty areas, notably 
increasing foreign direct investments (FDI) or stimulating high economic growth. However, 
the visa-free agreement has brought clear benefits to the Georgian population. Until 2021, over 
500 000 Georgians have used the visa-free regime (Agenda.ge 2019).  
Currently, Georgia is going through the long road of harmonizing domestic legislation with 
that of the EU. However, after successful AA/DCFTA and visa-free travel negotiations, Georgia 
closed a significant chapter and exhausted the existing strategy. As President of Georgia Salome 
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Zurabishvili mentioned in her speech during her official visit to Brussels, "currently the real 
question is where we go from here" (civil.ge 2019). Representatives of both governmental and 
non-governmental sectors in Georgia argue that a comprehensive reform of the EaP is needed 
to keep it an attractive project for the partner countries (Chkhikvadze 2019, 68). 
Overall, the EU contributed to the creation of institutional ground needed for the network 
mode of governance. Scholars argue that although the mode of governance that the EU favours 
in Georgia fits the network governance, it largely remains in the "shadow of hierarchy" 
(Heritier 2002, 11; Delcour 2013, 352). This can be explained by the proposed rewards the 
partner countries can potentially receive under the increased incentives EaP offered, which 
are more robust than those under ENP (ibid). The list of incentives includes a signed  EU-
Georgia AA that entered into force in July 2016. Two sides have also entered into a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), while Georgian citizens have benefited from visa-
free travel to the Schengen area since 2017. Moreover, the EU is Georgia's largest trading 
partner and provides over €120 million annual grant assistance to Georgia (European 
Commission, n.d.). 
What brings additional value to this particular case study is the wide range of external actors 
with political and economic interests that concern Georgia and the EaP region in general. Most 
of the academic literature that analyzes Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration narrowly focuses 
on the EU-centered and Western actors while paying little attention to other major actors. A 
wide range of external players has more interest and influence in the EaP region compared to 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Western Balkans (WB) (Lebanidze 2018, 6). There 
is a gap in the existing literature about European integration that covers regional integration 
processes. 
However, few exceptions look beyond EU-centric factors (ibid). They emphasized rather 
general dimensions such as economic and political. Nevertheless, they give helpful insight as 
to how different integrational projects coexist in the EaP region. Economic and trade relations 
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are an essential part of integrational projects. It is argued that geopolitics are being played out 
by economic means (ibid,7; Luttwak 1990, 20). At first glance, we could assume that the 
availability of choices potentially means easier ways to diversify the economy, but not in the 
case of post-Soviet small states. Georgia, however, managed to do so mainly because of two 
main factors: worsened relations with Russia and openly declared a pro-Euro-Atlantic vector 
of the Georgian government (Lebanidze 2018, 7). Additionally, the overall influence of regional 
actors remains negative. Dependency on illiberal actors, as Lebanidze (ibid, 22)  argued, "has 
repeatedly forced Georgia to enter into normative conflicts with the West". On the other hand, 
Russia has been blocking Georgia's attempts to join NATO by using political and security 
destabilization tools. However, despite challenging conditions, the EU managed to establish 
itself as the most important economy, trade, investments partner as well as the security 
provider for Georgia (ibid). 
A study by Kakachia et al. (2019) applies ideational and consequentialist incentives to explain 
how different incentives influence the choice of EaP countries towards Europe regardless of 
the difficulties on their path. A paper by Lebanidze (2018) adds other integrational processes 
as an essential factor.  As argued in the example of Georgia and Ukraine, having sovereignty 
and territorial integrity endangered by strong regional actors and having newly recalibrated 
national identities with the European centre contributes to their European integration. At the 
same time, Soviet-era socio-political practices, illiberal attitudes, lack of good governance and 
socio-economic development keeps pulling EaP frontrunners back (Kakachia, Lebanidze, and 
Dubovyk 2019, 459).  
As identified above, certain areas of European integration remain underresearched. Namely, 
there is a gap in the existing literature about European integration that covers regional 
integration processes, especially on a sectoral level. For example, there is only a limited number 
of literature, for example, a paper by Baltag and Romanyshyn (2011), that focuses both on the 
impact of Russia as an external actor and domestic factors that influence EU-third country 
relations while keeping sector-specific focus. This paper will attempt to fill in those gaps and 
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possibly open new doors for future researchers. A combination of variables and influencing 
factors from a number of analytical approaches will be used for that. The purpose of not 
limiting the analyses with a single approach is to include EU-based factors and domestic and 
external variables. Combining variables from different analytical approaches has been tested 
previously by Barbé et al. (2009); however, the authors tested them in larger policy areas such 
as foreign and security policy. None of the case studies had signed AA. There are several reasons 
behind the gap in the literature. Namely, the aspect of Europeanization and EU external 
governance in non-candidate countries is relatively new. 
Additionally, scholars either choose not to take a sector-specific approach, or the role of the 
external actors is being overlooked.  To see a clear picture, it's important to take into look at 
the EU, as a power that exercises external governance, Georgia, as a country that is receiving 
it and external powers, who also have their interest in the region and may influence the 
relations between the EU and the target country. This paper aims at doing this while also 
keeping a sector-specific approach rather than looking at broader concepts of democracy and 
good governance in general.  
Lastly, the timing is also important as 2020 marked an important milestone in EU-Georgia's 
relations. Mainly because that's when the previous Action Plan and Deliverables for 2020 have 
expired; although those documents cover a wide range of sectors and aspects of cooperation 
between the two sides, three sectors were chosen for this research - trade, energy, and 
environment remain among the ones in which Georgia is largely exposed to acquis. They carry 
political and economic weight to them that goes beyond Georgia and the EU and involves other 
regional and global players. Additionally, the research will follow the recommendations given 
by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009, 809) that existing literature "points to a possible next 
step in the development of the external governance approach which may focus less on what 
the EU does in promoting its norms than...on the domestic conditions for effective policy 




As the European Union became a global political actor, it began to export internal rules and 
models of governance outside its borders. Enlargement has been praised as the most successful 
tool for the EU to exercise its external governance.  However, in the absence of membership 
conditionality, the EU offers target countries smaller incentives, such as partnership, AAs, 
access to the EU sectoral market, etc.  Börzel and Schimmelfennig (2017) argue that smaller 
incentives cannot substitute the membership conditionality and its effect on Europeanization. 
However, by looking at the AA implementation and various other reports assessing Georgia's 
performance in aligning the domestic rules and legislation with the EU's acquis, Georgia is 
often praised as a frontrunner in democracy and good governance developments in the region.  
The study aims to analyze the various factors that could explain the reasons behind Georgia's 
adaptation of EU rules and regulations between 2016-2020 without membership 
conditionality. The research will take a sector-specific approach and analyze trade, 
environment, and energy policy areas to achieve this.  
The main research question is the following: 
Q: Why does Georgia adopt good governance standards without the EU membership 
perspective? 
To answer the research question, this paper will follow the outcome-centric single case study 
approach. A case study is a research strategy through which a contemporary phenomenon is 
being analyzed within its natural context while using multiple sources of evidence and asking 
explanatory questions such as “how” and “why” (Yin 2003). While tracking the operational 
links over time, the research primarily focuses on explaining the outcome, which is the 
adoption of good governance standards. To achieve this, the paper assesses potential and 
alternative explanations by considering independent and intervening variables such as EU 
Incentives (IV), Domestic Adoption Cost and External Influence (intervening variables) and 
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their influence on different variances in the Commitment of Georgia (DV) to adopt EU rules 
and regulations.  
External Governance has been established as the main framework of this research as it has 
proven to be a useful way to capture the extension of EU rules and legislations beyond 
membership or beyond candidate countries, to analyze how the EU supports democratic 
reforms and projects EU rules beyond its borders (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 795). It 
does so by outlining variables that affect these processes. Primary variables of this paper cover 
three major theoretical approaches that explain different modes of the EU external governance 
(Youngs 2009). 
 
Variables Theoretical approach 
Independent 
Variable 
• EU Incentives • Neo-institutionalist 
explanation 




• Domestic Adoption 
Costs 
• Domestic factors explanation 
 
 
• External Actors • Power Based explanation 
 
Table 1. Variables and corresponding theoretical approach 
Currently, Georgia does not possess the status of membership candidate country. The 
Governance analytical model is the most suitable for analyzing Europeanisation in this case, 
especially when following the sector-specific path (Lavenex 2011a, 939). Additionally, the 
35 
 
governance model considers all three of the theoretical approaches that the above-described 
variables are drawn from (Lavenexa and Schimmelfennig 2011, 33). 
4.1 Case selection and timeframe 
Several factors determined the selection of the case study. Firstly, 17 years since the Eastern 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched, most of the neighbours both in the South and in the 
East demonstrate the same or lower quality of democratic development. Georgia is one of the 
exceptions, together with Moldova, Ukraine and Tunisia. In regular reports on the progress 
towards democracy and public speeches of high ranking EU officials, Georgia is often 
mentioned as the frontrunner among the Eastern Partnership countries (Agenda.ge 2017; 
European Parliament 2021; Civil Society Forum 2018). Secondly, EU-Georgia relations have 
entered a new level of cooperation with the AA, DCFTA and Visa-liberalisation granted to 
Georgia citizens in recent years (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia n.d.). On the other 
hand, the Georgian side expressed commitment to harmonize national legislation with at least 
346 EU directives, 213 EU regulations, 57 EU decisions and 31 EU recommendations 
(Parliament of Georgia 2019, 6). The aforementioned directives, regulations, decisions and 
recommendations cover a wide range of sectors, including the three which are of specific 
interest to this research.  
Timeframe for the research will be between 2016 and 2020. 2016 marks the year when the AA 
between the European Union and Georgia fully entered into force. The same year the first 
Association Implementation Report on Georgia was published by the European Commission 
(2016a), the annual report that outlines major progress or the lack of it in terms of obligations 
and undertakings of the AA throughout the year. In 2016 the Council of Europe adopted the 
2016-2019 Action Plan for Georgia (Council of Europe 2016). 2020 also marks an important 
milestone in EU-Georgia Relations. Firstly, the Council of Europe introduced a new Action 
Plan for Georgia for 2020-2023 (Council of Europe 2019). 
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Moreover, "20 Deliverables for 2020" was an ambitious work plan that outlined the number of 
objectives to reach by 2020 in Eastern Partnership countries, including Georgia (European 
Commission 2017b). Overall, 2020 marks six years since the AA (AA) between the European 
Union (EU) and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one 
part, and Georgia, of the other part provisionally entered into force and four years since it fully 
entered into force. Although some obligations taken by the Georgian side are of a medium or 
long term nature, some directives, regulations, recommendations and decisions have already 
had their deadline by 2020. Moreover, taking into account Georgia's ambitious plan to apply 
for EU membership by 2024 brings additional relevance to the country's progress in recent 
years and the factors that may have influenced Georgia's way towards democracy and good 
governance development (Lavrelashvili and Hecke 2021). 
Moving to sectors, trade, energy and environment policy areas are covered under the AA and 
subject of close monitoring by the EU, the Georgian government and non-governmental 
organizations. Title IV of the AA is entirely dedicated to trade and trade-related matters. Two 
other sectors listed in my research are covered in the Title VI of the AA. Namely, Chapter 2 - 
energy cooperation and chapter 3 - Environment. Furthermore,  energy and environment 
sectors are closely monitored by the Energy Community, and all three sectors are covered in 
the annual Association Implementation Report on Georgia by the European Commission. 
What's also significant is the resources invested in those sectors by the EU. Namely, there have 
been 83 projects funded by the EU that Georgia benefited from in economic development and 
better market opportunities, covering the trade sector and  45 in Connectivity, energy 
efficiency, environment and climate change, which covers the other two sectors analyzed in 
this paper. There has been a noticeable boost in projects since the AA was signed between the 




Figure 1.  EU sectoral projects in Georgia before and after 2014.  Author’s elaboration (based 
on EU4Georgia.ge) 
 
4.2 Conceptualization and operationalization 
This research will apply triple division (weak, medium, strong) for each indicator assigned to 
the variables. Each of the dividing measures will be individually defined for each indicator. 
4.2.1 EU Incentives 
The Independent variable of this research is the "EU Incentives" offered to Georgia in exchange 
for compliance with the EU rules, regulations and meeting the obligations. This is a common 
variable used by scholars when analysing the EU's external governance. The paper uses the 
following indicators to measure the independent variable: the size of the reward, determinacy 
of conditions and credibility of conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008b).  
Firstly, the EU rules and norms adoption are the conditions for receiving a reward as part of 
"EU incentives". Potential rewards can include financial assistance, institutional association, 
partial or complete access to the market or- ultimately – membership (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2020; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). EU conditionality is mainly positive, 
which means that it offers rewards when countries meet the criteria. In case of failure, 
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countries are denied whichever reward they were offered. In other words, "the EU offers and 
withholds carrots but does not carry a big stick" (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008, 190). The 
EU's position is that governments in target countries should take the responsibility to create 
the conditions and meet the agreed terms to be rewarded. In this research, the size of reward 
refers to a type of institutional arrangement that the EU is offering to a country in case of rule 
adoption. There are three types of rewards outlined, varying from weak to medium and strong: 
1) sectoral cooperation, 2) access to the sectoral market and active financial support, 3) 
membership.    
The next indicator is the determinacy of the conditions. Determinacy implies letting the target 
government know the conditions for getting the reward (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2020, 817). Therefore, three measurements to determine the degree of determinacy are the 
following. If the conditions, timelines and rules are constantly specified in the official 
documents such as annual Action Plans, determinacy is strong. Determinacy is medium if they 
have initially been defined under the AA and in the Energy Community Treaty and are rarely 
updated or addressed in reports and action plans. Lastly, in case of conditions and rules being 
vaguely specified under the AA or other official documents regarding the commitments 
Georgia has taken but have not been the subject of update or further specification, determinacy 
is weak.   
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig outline two important aspects of determinacy. Firstly, it has an 
informational value. The second aspect has to do with my following indicator - credibility. 
Namely, "determinacy enhances the credibility of conditionality" (Lavenexa and 
Schimmelfennig 2011, 894). Time-inconsistency plays an important role in conditionality. 
Target countries have to meet the set conditions before they receive the reward. Therefore, 
both EU's threats and promises have to be credible for the target country to commit to rule 
adoption, i.e. the EU has to be able to withhold the reward at a very low or no cost, the target 
government has to be more interested in getting the reward than the EU in giving it.   
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General propositions regarding the indicators are that an increase in all three (size, determinacy 
and credibility) increases the likelihood of the target government prioritising them and, 
therefore, increases the commitment (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2020, 817). Other 
propositions are the following - promised rewards have to be in the EU's capability to deliver, 
and they should not be distant for the credibility to be high. This research uses the following 
measurements for credibility: for the credibility to be weak, the EU should not be able to 
withhold the rewards,  the point when the target country gets the reward should be distant 
due to high dependency on other conditions. For medium credibility, the EU should not be 
able or interested in withholding the reward even if the target country does not meet the 
conditions. On the other hand, receiving the full benefits from the rewards should depend on 
different conditions. Lastly, for strong credibility, the EU should be able to withhold the 
promises at any point if the conditions are not met, and it needs to be specified when the target 
country will receive the reward, assuming all the commitments and conditions have been 
fulfilled. It should be noted that distance to the reward, also described as the speed of reward, 
may vary between the sectors and types of rewards. As establishing a specific time period to 
measure the distance to the reward would give inconsistent results, it has been linked with the 















1 Weak If promised only sectoral cooperation 
2 Medium If promised access to sectoral market 





1 Weak Conditions and rules have been vaguely specified and are not a subject of 
update 
2 Medium Conditions and rules have been initially specified but are rarely or never 
being updated 








1 Weak The EU can or will not withhold the reward if the conditions are not met, 
the speed of reward depends on other conditions.   
2 Medium The EU can withhold the rewards if conditions are not met, receiving the 
full benefits from the promised reward  depends on other conditions.  
3 Strong The EU can withhold the rewards if conditions are not met and the reward 
can be paid once the conditions are met 
 
Table 2. Operationalization of EU Incentives 
4.2.2 Commitment 
This takes me to a dependent variable – commitment, which measures how committed the 
target country is to meet conditions to receive the reward. The notion of commitment is 
embodied in the concept of external governance. According to Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 
(2011, 896), “External governance refers to institutionalized relationships with non-member 
states…in which [partner countries] commit themselves to approximate their domestic policies 
and legislation to the EU acquis”. This research uses two indicators to measure the degree of 
commitment. If the rule adoption is described as slow and missed deadlines is a recurring case 
throughout the reports, adoption assessment will be Weak. If the adoption process received 
overall positive feedback with occasional delays in the adoption/implementation process for 
which the country provided an explanation and therefore was not considered a severe violation 
by the EU, the indicator would be evaluated as Medium. Lastly, if the rule adoption is assessed 
as fully up to date across all the reports, rule adoption will be assessed as Strong.  Similar 
measurements apply for the rule implementation assessment. If the adopted rules are only 
formally adopted and not integrated into the legislation, they will be assessed as weak. 
However, if they are formally adopted, and the full integration is delayed according to the 
official deadlines, the rule implementation degree will be Medium. Lastly, for the indicator to 




















1 Weak Rule adoption process is assessed according to the reports as 
slow and country is often criticized for missing adoption 
deadlines. 
2 Medium Rule adoption process is assessed according to the reports as 
satisfactory with occasionally missed deadlines, which is not 
considered as a harsh violation. 
3 Strong Rule adoption is fully up to schedule. No criticism in regards 




1 Weak Rules outlined in the action plans only formally adopted and 
not integrated into national legislation 
2 Medium Rules outlined in action plans are formally adopted but full 
integration is lagging behind the official schedule. 
3 Strong Rules outlined in  action plans are formally adopted as well as 
fully integrated into the domestic legislation. 
 
Table 3. Operationalization of Commitment 
 
4.2.3 Intervening Variables 
Additionally, the research will be looking at two intervening variables: domestic adoption costs 
and external influence. Two types of domestic adoption costs that can affect the commitment 
of the target country are veto players and administrative capacity. Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeir (2020, 818) argue that domestic adoption costs rise with the number of veto players 
on the other hand and with the lack of administrative capacity and expertise to implement the 
EU rules and regulations on the other. Georgia is an interesting case due to the power and 
influence of one particular veto player and how the other, less influential ones are connected 
with him. Therefore this research won't emphasise the number of veto players but rather their 
influence and interests in regards to legal approximation with the EU standards. Tsebelis (2002, 
17–19) defines veto players as actors whose agreement is necessary to change the status quo. 
Tsebelis (ibid, 19) differentiates between institutional (for example, presidency and parliament) 
and partisan (political parties and relevant majorities) veto players. However, it has been argued 
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that often in countries with a communist legacy, informal veto players can be observed 
(Hellman 1998, 233). It has been demonstrated how the interest of the informal veto players 
influence the constitutional/formal veto players in government and parliament, and even EU-
driven reforms can get vetoed as a result (A. L. Dimitrova 2010). Therefore, Georgia being a 
post-communist country, it is assumed that rule adoption, even at a sector-specific level, will 
depend on the interaction of the policy change in those sectors with the interests of these 
formal and informal veto players. The degree of veto players can be either weak, medium or 
strong. If no informal veto players can be identified or their interest does not go against the EU 
driven reforms, the indicator is weak. Veto players will be assessed as a medium in case of 
identified veto players or a group of veto players operating together, whose actions can, to a 
degree, harm the overall process of Europeanization in Georgia. However, interest does not 
always go directly against the undertaken commitments by Georgia. The influence of veto 
players can be considered strong in the case of identified veto players or groups of veto players 
if their interests go against the EU-driven reforms, and reports often mention them as one of 
the most critical obstacles for Georgian way towards the EU. 
Europeanisation literature often considers countries' administrative capacity when analysing 
compliance with the EU rules in target countries (Börzel and Sedelmeier 2017). For example, 
administrative capacity has been a differentiating factor when analysing the Northern and 
EFTA enlargement rounds and comparing them to the Southern and Eastern enlargement 
rounds of the EU (ibid, 199). Scholars outline several factors that influence a country's 
administrative capacity, such as inefficient administrations driven by corruption and 
patronage, authoritarian legacies, weakly organised societal interests, low level of socio-
economic development, etc. (ibid). With all these factors in mind, administrative capacity will 
be weak if the available resources are highly limited and the government fails to use even the 
available resources efficiently. Administrative capacity will be considered medium if, due to 
the lack of resources and corruption, administrative services are limited, but the government 
overall does a good job at making the most out of available resources. Lastly, administrative 
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capacity will be measured as strong if there are sufficient administrative resources to 
implement the EU-driven reforms and the government uses them efficiently.  
Moving to my second intervening variable, the external governance approach considers EU 
institutional factors, domestic factors in target countries, and the influence of external 
"governance provider" actors (Wunderlich and Wunderlich 2012, 1417). While Georgia being 
a post-soviet country, it naturally falls under the sphere of interest of the Russian Federation 
(Trenin 2009; Baltag and Romanyshyn 2011, 15). Lebanidze (2020) has shown how Russia and 
the EU influence the regime outcomes and the general quality of democracy in post-Soviet 
space. This research, however, will focus narrowly more on specific sectors and how the 
presence of one global actor in a small country may influence the external governance of the 
other. This will be done strictly on a sector-specific level and concerning the EU's external 
governance, rather than comparing Russian and EU influence on Georgian democracy in 
general. 
Previous reports also demonstrate how Russia tried to offer alternative options to the EU 
initiatives in the EaP countries (Popescu and Wilson 2009). On the other hand, due to the EU 
and Russia being economically superior to Georgia, the interdependence between them and 
Georgia can be characterised as highly asymmetric. As Lebanidze (2018, 17) argues, economic 
means are the significant determinants of geopolitics. Therefore, to measure the impact of 
external influence on the commitment to the EU-driven reforms, the comparison will be 
between the economic leverage of two major regional actors - Russia and the EU and the 
influence it has on the adoption of the  EU rules and regulations in their shared neighbourhood, 
namely Georgia. The level of external influence will be determined by purely economic factors 
such as exports, imports and foreign direct investments in particular sectors. Other factors will 
include sector-specific interests that Russia might have in Georgia. The external influence will 
be considered weak if the economic indicators mentioned above are significantly lower in the 
case of Russia than the ones between the EU and Georgia, and the alternative projects are 
neither strong nor attractive compared to the ones offered by the EU.  Russian influence will 
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be considered medium if the overall trade size and alternative projects offered by Russia are 
somewhat similar with the same indicator of the EU. Lastly, the external influence is strong if 
empirical data shows that Georgia has stronger economic ties with Russia than the EU. On the 
other hand, the Russian alternative projects in particular sectors appear more attractive than 
the EU's. It's important to remember that trade will include overall export and import between 
















1 Weak No informal veto players or their interests do not go against the EU-
driven reforms.  
2 Medium There is a veto player of a group of them operating gotherher, whose 
actions can, to a degree, harm the overall process of Europeanization 
in Georgia. However, interest does not always go directly against the 
undertaken commitments by Georgia. 
3 Strong Active presence of an influential group of informal veto whose 
business or political interests openly go against Georgia’s European 








3 Weak Available resources are limited and the government makes efficient 
use of only some of available limited  human, financial and 
organizational resources. 
2 Medium The operation of administrative services is limited and to some 
extend deficient (lack of resources, corruption, inefficiency) and the 
government makes efficient use of most available human, financial 
and organizational resources 
1 Strong There are sufficient administrative resources in order to implement 
the EU-driven reforms and the government makes efficient use of all 






0 None • If the Russian interests in the specific sector can not be 
identified and are not taken into consideration 
• If Georgia and Russia have no sector-specific trade 
relations and there is no dependency.   
1 Weak • If overall trade and FDI with Russia is significantly lower 














Leverage of Russia 
compared to the EU 
• Russia has special interest in the sector. Russia is either not 
offering the alternative projects and mechanisms or they 
are much weaker and less attractive than the ones offered 
by the EU. 
2 Medium • If overall trade and FDI with Russia and the EU are roughly 
the same in particular sector. 
• Russia has  special interest in the sector but the alternative 
projects and mechanisms Russia offers are similarly 
attractive  for the target country as the ones offered by the 
EU. 
3 Strong • If overall trade and FDI with Russia is much greater than 
the ones with the EU in particular sector. 
• Russia has special interest in the sector and the alternative 
projects and mechanisms offered by Russia are more 
attractive for the target country than the ones offered by 
the EU 
 
Table 4. Operationalization of Domestic Adoption Costs and External Influence 
4.3 Primary sources and data collection   
This research uses interdisciplinary qualitative analyses of primary and secondary sources. 
Namely, 54 individual documents of different types such as official documents, declarations, 
reports conducted by the EU, Georgian government or various NGOs, and scientific literature 
have been analyzed. Moreover, different statistical data has been collected from the National 
Statistics Office of Georgia.  Data has been gathered from trustworthy media sources such as 
OC Media, Civil Georgia, Radio Liberty, etc. Several international rankings used in the research 
include the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index,  Ease of doing business index by the World Bank, Absence of 
Unconstitutional Veto Players ranking by the Freedom Barometer. 
Interviews were conducted to fill the informational gap left after the analyses of the sources 
mentioned above. Seven semi-structured interviews were conducted between  June 7 and 15, 
2021, via the digital platform Zoom. Each of the interviewees was selected due to their 
expertise in one or multiple sectors specific to this research. Only one out of seven interviewees 
chose to keep her identity anonymous (Appendix B).  
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To analyze EU incentives and the indicators used to measure the variable, information has been 
gathered from secondary sources such as the AA, EU/Georgia action plans and annual reports 
on the implementation of the EU AA with Georgia, 20 Deliverables for 2020, etc.   
As for the commitment, secondary data such as AA, EU/Georgia action plans, Action Plan of 
the Parliament of Georgia for the Implementation of the EU-Georgia AA, Energy Community 
implementation reports, annual reports on the implementation of the EU AA with Georgia 
have been used together with reports on the implementation of AA and 20 Deliverables for 
2020 by various NGO’s (Lebanidze et al. 2020) and the data extracted from the webpages of the 
departments of Georgia Parliament assigned to the rule adoption and implementation in 
particular sectors. 
Regarding the domestic adoption costs, different sources have been used to measure veto 
players and administrative capacity. Namely, reports by Freedom Barometer, Transparency 
International, including data extracted from the BTI -The Transformation Index and expert 
interviews. To measure administrative capacity  
AA Implementation reports have been used. Moreover, the number of indicators of BTI -The 
Transformation Index provides valuable insights about the shortcomings or efficiency of 
administrative capacity in countries. To account for the role of corruption, which is often taken 
into account as a negative factor determining administrative capacity (BTI),  data from the 
Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International has been used. 
Lastly, to measure external influence, statistical information regarding the trade and Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) has been extracted from the data available at the National Statistics 
Office of Georgia (Geostat.ge) as well as from the Energy Policy Review by the International 
Energy Agency and Electricity Market Operator (ESCO).  
When measuring individual variables,  each of the indicators will be assigned a number to 
determine the strength. 0-none (for External Influence only), 1-weak, 2-medium, 3-strong. 
The exception being administrative capacity, where 3=weak, 2=medium and 1=strong, because 
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strong administrative capacity, contrary, for example, to veto players, translate into lower 
adoption costs. Another exception is the external influence, where in addition to weak, 
medium, strong, there is 0=None. After measuring each indicator individually, the arithmetical 




















5. Analysis and Research Results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will measure each indicator as described in the methodology chapter to assess the 
degree of each variable. First of all, the results of the empirical data analyses about EU 
incentives and Georgian commitment will be discussed. Next, the degree of veto players and 
administrative capacity will be measured to determine the level of domestic adoption costs. 
Lastly, external influence will be analysed by looking at Russian leverage and comparing it to 
the EU where relevant. All the measurements will be done on a sectoral basis where possible, 
with a few exceptions. 
5.2 EU Incentives 
Firstly, the chapter will start by analyzing the size of rewards that the EU promises Georgia in 
exchange for approximating the domestic legislation with the EU acquis, followed by the 
different factors that influence the determinacy of the set conditions and the credibility of 
rewards promised to Georgia. 
5.2.1 Size of Rewards 
Most of the benefits of meeting conditions set by the EU  in the trade policy area are covered 
under the DCFTA part of the AA. Even the provisional DCFTA application before it fully 
entered into force removed customs tariffs and quotas and comprehensively approximated 
trade-related laws and regulations with the EU standards. DCFTA provided for Georgia trade 
opportunities and a roadmap that allows the modernisation and acceleration of domestic 
industries. It facilitates Georgia's "progressive integration with the EU single market" 
(European Commission 2016a, 2). Integration of Georgia to the EU Single market is the ultimate 
objective of the EU-Georgia AA/DCFTA. This is specified in the AA document ("European 
Union - Georgia AA" 2014, 7). Additionally, it is mentioned in the annual Association 
Implementation Reports published by the European Commission and reports on the 
implementation of the EU AA with Georgia by the European Parliament (European 
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Commission 2016a, 2). In the latest report by the European Parliament (2020, 15), the EP called 
on the European Commission "to be more vocal in setting the target of the access to the Single 
Market for Georgia and step up initiatives aimed at deeper sectoral integration to achieve more 
policy convergence of Georgia with the EU and make the deliverables of bilateral cooperation 
more visible and measurable for both sides". Therefore messages from Brussels have been clear 
- Georgia is not promised membership in exchange for implementing the AA/DCFTA but 
instead access and gradual integration with the EU market (European Commission 2016b). 
Although the AA/DCFTA was developed to facilitate closer linkages between the EU and 
countries without a membership perspective, it nevertheless brings tangible benefits for 
Georgia in the trade policy area along multiple channels. Benefits of the AA/DCFTA wary from 
short and medium term to long term.  The "trade" and "deep" aspects of the DCFTA respectively 
focus on the elimination/reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to bilateral trade. They are 
aimed at easing access to the EU market and boosting exports.  
Noteworthy, the AA includes an option of adding an Agreement on Conformity Assessment 
and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA) as a protocol of the AA ("European Union - 
Georgia AA" 2014, 21). It will allow the EU and Georgia to trade products under the same 
conditions as between the Member States. However, it will become part of the agenda after 
Georgia fully approximates the relevant sectoral legislation with that of the EU (ibid). 
Nevertheless, the EU remains Georgia's largest trading partner. In the first eleven months of 
2020, trade turnover between the EU and Georgia amounted to EUR 2.1 billion (≈ 2.6 billion 
USD) (European Commission 2021, 2). Liberalisation of imports over time led to more efficient 
domestic industries and lowered intermediate and final goods prices. On the other hand, strict 
EU requirements will lead to higher quality and more competitive products over time (Adarov 
and Havlik 2016, 24). The regulatory approximation is also expected to improve the supportive 











Table 5. Ease of Doing Business ranking, Georgia.  (2014-2019). Author’s elaboration (based on 
The World Bank Ease of Doing Business ranking) 
In 2014 Georgia ranked 24th in the Ease of Doing Business according to the World Bank annual 
ranking. It reached the 6th position in 2018 and currently holds the 7th position in the world. 
There has been a gradual increase in the trade between Georgia and the EU since 2014 from 
$2.7 billion to $3.1 billion in 2019.  FDI from the EU to Georgia has followed a similar pattern, 
growing from $425 million in 2014 to  $656 million in 2019. With a significant inflow of FDI 
over $800 million per year in 2014, 2015 and 2017 (geostat.ge.). 




Regarding specific products, although Georgian imports from the EU between 2014 and 2019 
mainly remained the same, except for an increase of 2135% in imported machinery for mining 
industries, there has been a significant structural change in the Georgian exports to the EU 
between the same period. Namely, copper ores and concentrates accounted for over 50% of 
total Georgian exports to the EU, with $462 million in value in 2019 (256% growth compared 
to 2014). Traditional Georgian exports such as wine and mineral water also saw a steady 
increase between 2014 and 2019 with 52% and 39%, respectively (geostat.ge). 
It has been argued that the effects of the DCFTA implementation are distributed unequally 
over the implementation period, and the full benefits will be felt by the target country in the 
long run and will heavily depend on the implementation of certain aspects of the agreement 
(Adarov and Havlik 2016, 70). In the interview, Vato Lejava (2021) described this as "There is 
a lot of pain before gain". Therefore, the empirical data does not fully represent the incentives 
promised by the EU as the implementation process is still ongoing. The economic incentives 
offered by the EU are there, and the real-life benefits will depend on Georgia's commitments 
to approximate domestic legislation with that of the EU. However, the access to the EU single 
market remains the highest reward promised to Georgia by the EU.  
Rewards promised by the EU in the energy and environment policy areas are similar with the 
trade - access and integration into the EU market through regulatory convergence (European 
Commission 2017a). Alignment of the domestic legislation with the EU acquis is in accordance 
with the priorities of the Georgian government: diversification of the energy market, 
increasing energy supply security, strengthening of regional cooperation, increasing energy 
efficiency, etc. An important incentive was the accession to the Energy Community on July 1st 
2017. This membership brings additional benefits for Georgia, such as creating a competitive 
and sustainable energy system with increased customer's rights, increased transparency and 
cut down corruption in the sector (Civil Georgia 2017). Moreover, the Energy Community 
covers environmental protection and assists in approximation with European legislation, 
implementation of the AA, which ultimately will lead to Georgia's integration in the pan-
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European energy market and the EU single market (Kochladze et al. 2015, 4). Among the 
energy sector-related initiatives, Georgia is part of the EU4Energy Initiative, which "aims to 
improve energy data and statistics quality, shape regional policy-making discussions, 
strengthen the legislative and regulatory framework, and improve access to information in the 
partner countries" (Zygierewicz 2020, 16). EU4Energy programme for 2016-2020, which has a 
budget of €21 million, is an essential component of the initiative (ibid, 17). EU driven 
incentives to align domestic legislation in the environment sector is closely linked with the 
attractiveness of the single EU energy market as those two sectors are intertwined. Therefore, 
the development of energy and environmental policies in Georgia, which is happening with 
the active support of the European Union, are in line with each other. The EU assists by 
initiating important environmental programmes, green economy, renewable energy and 
energy efficiency, such as the EU's Black Sea Basin Cross-Border Cooperation (European 
Commission n.d.). 
The European Union's support is not limited to funding relevant projects. Georgia receives 
essential support in developing domestic action plans and legislation that will help with the 
approximation process. One of the latest examples of that is a high-level policy talks event 
organised by the EU4Energy Governance to support Georgia with developing the National 
Energy and Climate Plan (NECP). Top experts of the Energy Community Secretariat provide 
their expertise on relevant aspects of EU/Energy Community and climate policy and relevant 
EU regulatory and organisational practices (Energy Community 2020). Initiatives such as 
EU4Climate, funded by the European Union (EU) and implemented by UNDP, support the 
Georgian government in implementing the Paris Agreement, which Georgia officially joined 
in 2017 (agenda.ge 2017). Moreover, it works with the Georgian government to attract climate 
investments, helps with the alignment of domestic legislation with the EU acquis and enhances 




Although voluntary approximation of domestic legislation with the EU laws, in general, will 
bring benefits to a country, there are additional benefits in the form of increased determinacy 
when carrying out an approximation process via AA/DCFTA and following Energy 
Community instructions, such as financial and technical support. Single Support Framework 
(2014-2016) and (2017-2020) outline those policy areas the EU is directing its financial 
assistance. The EU allocated  EUR 610 million to EUR 746 million between 2014-2020. EUR 
371million to EUR 453 million of which is for 2017-2020. The largest percentage of total 
allocations for 2017-2020 (40% or EUR 148-181.2 million) is for economic development and 
market opportunities (European Commission 2017c). The assistance aims to boost the benefits 
of the AA/DCFTA and regional trade, improve the business and economic environment, 
support structural reforms and approximation process in general (ibid). 
 
Figure 3. The indicative breakdown of the SSP Funding by sector. Author’s elaboration (based 





EUR 55.65-67.97 million (15% of total allocations) is for energy efficiency, climate change and 
connectivity. Among the objectives of fundings for energy efficiency, environment, and 
climate change are enhancing energy efficiency and increasing energy independence, 
improving energy interconnections for market development and security purposes, and 
meeting Paris Agreement targets (ibid). It is important to note that more specific objectives are 
closely connected with the obligations taken by Georgia under the AA. Moreover, each of the 
objectives outlined in the Single Support Framework documents have specific indicators as well 
as means of verification. This sort of breakdown clarifies to the target government what to do 
and how their progress will be assessed, thus increasing the determinacy of conditions. 
Additionally, each Single Support Framework document is being created, and prioritisation is 
performed in a correlation with the Annual Action Programmes, current and future 
Association Agenda’s, and sector-specific action plans (ibid). 
Georgia also benefits from the regional response package under the Team Europe initiative for 
support to the economy in the Eastern Partnership region (European Commission 2021, 17). 
The exact amount of financial support dedicated to implementing EU laws in each policy area 
is hard to determine due to the nature of regional programmes Georgia is part of, such as 
EU4Business, EU4Energy, EU4Innovation, etc. as they often combine assistance for multiple 
sectors (ibid, 18). Furthermore, Georgia benefits from EU Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA). 
The MFA operation that was launched in 2019 was completed in November 2020. Georgia 
received a total amount of EUR 150 million from this programme in the form of loans on highly 
favourable terms (ibid). EU is funding the Georgian Energy sector through various 
international financial institutions (IFIs): The EBRD is financing the EUR 5.7 million Svaneti 
hydropower plants (HPPs), the Kheladula HPP (costing EUR 24.6 million) and the climate-
resilience-improvement of Enguri HPP (EUR31 million) (Lebanidze et al. 2020, 82). Another 
important financial support includes the loan agreement for EUR 90 million between Georgia 
and KfW signed in 2020. The second loan agreement for EUR 120 million was signed the same 
year with AFD. Additionally, Georgia received an EU grant for EUR 8.44 million 
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Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP). Germany provided an additional EUR 7.4 million 
grant funding for Energy Efficiency-Measures in Kindergartens in Batumi (ibid, 83).  
We can conclude that the European Union is not only promising Georgia greater access to the 
European Market, elimination of numerous non-tariff barriers, legal system and institutions 
reforms, stabilisation of laws and high credibility of the country for foreign investors but also 
provides crucial financial assistance to implement those costly changes (Kawecka-
Wyrzykowska 2015, 93). As all three sectors are part of AA/DCFTA and covered by the Energy 
Community, obligations taken by the Georgian side in trade, energy and environment policy 
areas are equally strong, determinacy of conditions and credibility of the rewards are similar. 
The EU is using several tools to increase the determinacy of the incentives. The EU-Georgia 
AA consists of different legislative approximation mechanisms specified in several parts of the 
Agreement. Individual chapters of the AA have different objectives. More specifically, the 
approximation provisions are found in Title IV(DCFTA), Title V (Economic cooperation), Title 
VI (Other cooperation policies) and Title VIII (Institutional, general and final provisions) 
(“European Union - Georgia AA” 2014). 
“Georgia shall carry out gradual approximation of its legislation to EU 
law as referred to in the Annexes to this Agreement, based on 
commitments identified in this Agreement, and in accordance with the 
provisions of those Annexes. This provision shall be without prejudice 
to any specific principles and obligations on approximation under Title 
IV (Trade and Trade-related Matters) of this Agreement”. 
However, dynamic approximation (Article 418) assumes that the Association Council has a 
right to periodically update the Annexes of the Agreement, therefore, change the legislation 
that the country needs to align to. 
Documents such as Action Plan for Georgia (Council of Europe 2013; 2016; 2019) as well as EU-
Georgia Association Agenda (European Union 2013; 2017), Single Support Framework 
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(European Commission 2017c; 2014) are being developed to support Georgia in the legal 
approximation process. Additionally, annual AA implementation reports published by the 
Council of Europe and European Parliament and expert studies on the implementation degree 
commissioned by the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) ensures that 
the EU is not only giving the directives to Georgia but monitors the implementation, helps to 
set the priorities and supports the target country throughout the process of European 
integration. 
There are individual action plans that cover single or multiple sectors. For example, as a 
contracting party to the Energy Community Treaty, Georgia is obliged to implement the energy 
acquis in force together with secondary legislation. The implementation of those obligations is 
assessed based on comprehensive, multi-annual action plans and implementation reports 
(Energy Community n.d.). The aforementioned reports and action plans cover the energy and 
environment sectors. Furthermore, ambitious work plans such as "20 Deliverables for 2020" 
usually focus on a limited number of priority areas of cooperation.  Priorities of the "20 
Deliverables for 2020" included all three sectors discussed in this paper. All these monitoring 
mechanisms are used to actively assess the approximation of Georgian law to EU laws as defined 
in the AA and evaluate the degree of enforcement. Comprehensive assessment allows the EU 
to better sort out the priorities depending on the needs and possibilities. Those policy areas 
covered in the AA/DCFTA are similar in that regard. They are subject to close monitoring by 
the EU institutions either directly or through third-party reports. Georgia's progress regarding 
the implementation of the  AA in general and in specific policy sectors is supervised by the 
Association Council, which is the highest formal institution under the EU-Georgia AA. (EU 
Neighbours 2021a).   Additionally, the Delegation of the European Union to Georgia has the 
status of a diplomatic mission and officially represents the European Union in Georgia. The 
delegation's mandate includes monitoring the implementation of the AA between the European 
Union and Georgia and participates in the implementation of the European Union's assistance 




Moving to the credibility of rewards, as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2020, 816) argue, "if 
the target government rejects, or fails to meet, the conditions, the EU typically withholds the 
rewards without applying coercive sanctions. It pays the reward if the target government fulfils 
the conditions". Similar logic applies to the commitments of the Georgian side. The economic 
dimension of the AA, which directly covers trade and trade-related energy issues and indirectly 
addresses the environmental sector, is based on conditionality (Eteria 2020). Fulfilling the set 
conditions is essential to establish the EU compatible economic system and get the most out of 
the offered benefits by the DCFTA.  
Firstly, there are mechanisms in the AA. Namely, Chapter 14 of Title IV covers the disputes 
regarding the DCFTA part of the Agreement. Also, Articles 421 and 422  cover the dispute 
settlement and appropriate measures in case of non-fulfilment of obligations outlined in the 
rest of the Agreement respectively ("European Union - Georgia AA" 2014, 136). Those articles 
outline technical procedures in place in case of disputes concerning the AA's interpretation, 
implementation, or application. For the trade and trade-related energy policy areas, the first 
actions in case of dispute are consultations and mediations (ibid, 96). If the parties fail to resolve 
the dispute by consultations, the arbitration procedure is next (ibid, 97). Suppose, after all those 
measures the party complained against fails to demonstrate that it has taken measures to 
comply with the arbitration panel ruling in a reasonable period of time, which is described in 
Article 255 of the Agreement. In that case, the arbitration panel concludes that the party's 
obligations and actions are inconsistent with each other, the complaining party can request 
temporary compensation. Suppose the complaining party decides not to request a temporary 
compensation or the Agreement is not reached even after the compensation. In that case, the 
complaining party has the right to "suspend obligations arising from any provisions' referred 
to in Title IV of the Agreement at an "adequate level". The number of options the complaining 
party has when suspending the obligations includes the "increase its tariff rates to the level 
applied to other WTO Members" (ibid, 100). 
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Procedures are slightly different in other policy areas not directly covered in the DCFTA part 
of the Agreement. Suppose the European Union is concerned with any dispute regarding the 
Agreement's interpretation, implementation, or application. In that case, it must exhaust every 
possible measure, such as submitting the request to the Association Council and other relevant 
bodies specified in Articles 407 and 409 (ibid, 132). If, after exhaustion of available procedures, 
the complaining party decides that the other party has failed to fulfil an obligation under the 
Agreement, it is allowed to take appropriate measures. First of all, the measures should be to 
disturb the functioning of the AA the least. Secondly, such actions should not cause the 
suspension of rights or obligations outlined in the Title IV (Trade and Trade-related Matters) 
of the Agreement, with few exceptions such as violations of the essential elements also referred 
to as General Principles of the Agreement and in the case of the AA "not sanctioned by the 
general rules of international law" (ibid, 136). 
In sum, non-fulfilment of obligations under the AA can differ from appropriate measures 
depending on the sector and the violation's severity to suspend the obligations. The European 
Union can take away offered economic rewards by imposing previous tariffs and ultimately 
deny access to the EU market in respective sectors. The latter arises from the fact that access to 
the single market is permitted only after the domestic legislation is aligned with specific 
directives, regulations, recommendations and decisions responsible for trading a particular type 
of product.  As will be discussed below, the slight delays from the schedule are not considered 
a severe violation, especially when the target country explains why the deadline has not been 
met. This decreases the credibility of conditions. It allows the target countries to delay 
alignment with the EU acquis in certain areas and not get punished. However, although it is 
not deadline-related, recently, the EU requested the arbitration under the EU-Ukraine AA, 
which is the first precedent of the EU pursuing a trade dispute under a bilateral preferential 
trade agreement. The dispute is related to Ukraine's export restrictions on certain materials 
such as timber and unsawn wood of certain species (Tobias Dolle 2020). This should signal to 
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other countries the EU has signed the AA with those mechanisms outlined in the Agreement 
will be activated when needed. 
Experts specified the political and financial leverage during the interviews. Speaking about 
political leverage, Khaki Kenkadze (2021) outlined the importance of  Article 78 – Integration 
into European and Euro-Atlantic structures of the Constitution of Georgia. According to 
Kenkadze (2021), if a ruling or any other political party in Georgia openly declares that they 
are refusing to follow the EU instructions and consequently receive a harsh critique from the 
EU, they will be "politically dead" lose legitimacy. In general, according to Lebanidze, a positive 
attitude from the EU towards Georgian political forces is one of the primary sources of their 
legitimacy (Lebanidze, 2021). 
Regarding financial leverage,  the conditionality of the Macro-financial Assistance (MFA) 
provided to Georgia are outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding between the European 
Union and Georgia (2020) and differ from each MFA. For example, the recent Memorandum 
of Understanding outlines the implementation of specific reforms in the energy policy area as 
a conditionality for the disbursement of the second instalment. The previous Memorandum of 
Understanding (2018)  covers trade and financial sectors. The one published in 2013 addresses 
the commitments in trade and competition policy areas. It should be mentioned that the 
Memorandums (2013; 2018; 2020) are not limited only to those policy areas mentioned above 
and cover a wide range of aspects such as public finance management,  governance, labour 
market, etc.  
However, the degree of conditionality linked to EU Macro-Financial Assistance and budget 
support programmes are not fixed. In April of 2021, seven MEPs from four of the five largest 
groupings in the European Parliament, including the chairs of the EU relations with the South 
Caucasus, foreign affairs as well as the parliament's rapporteur on Georgia, signed a statement 
after "hastily designed and adopted" changes to the selection process of the Supreme Court 
Justice as well as the failed negotiations between the Government and opposition. In the 
statement, MEP's called for consequences by suspending further disbursements of the future 
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financial aid and increasing conditionality linked to EU Macro-Financial Assistance and budget 
support programmes. This increases the credibility of financial incentives offered to Georgia 
by the EU (OC Media 2021; Civil Georgia 2021). 
5.2.4 Summary 
To conclude,  the size of rewards in chosen policy areas are Medium as the EU does not promise 
membership to Georgia in exchange for the alignment of the domestic legislation with the EU 
acquis. However, bilateral relations in trade, energy, and the environment have gone beyond 
simple sectoral cooperation. This was clear after the provisional application of the DCFTA 
removed tariffs and quotas. Today Georgia is on its way to gradually enter the European Market 
and eventually sign the Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial 
Products (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2019). Moving to the determinacy of 
conditions, according to the measurements outlined in the methodology chapter, the indicator 
is assessed as Strong in all three sectors. Firstly, the conditions Georgia has to meet to get the 
promised rewards of Single Market access and financial and technical assistance are outlined 
in the AA. 
Moreover, since the two sides signed the Agreement in 2014, documents such as sector-specific 
action plans, Single Support Frameworks, AA as well as Energy Community annual 
implementation reports, etc. ensure that the Georgian side has a clear vision of what needs to 
be done to receive promised rewards from the EU. Furthermore, the EU is providing frequent 
feedback on the progress made and sets future priorities. Lastly, the credibility of threats and 
promises are Medium in all three sectors. Namely, in case of non-fulfilment of obligations, the 
EU has a mechanism at its disposal that can be used to withhold the promised rewards until 
Georgia meets the commitments. However, the financial assistance provided to Georgia is 
crucial for the country's development and implementation of the taken obligations. As a recent 
statement by the MEPs demonstrated, even if there is progress in specific sectors, the crucial 
financial aid may come into question by failing to meet the expectations and going against the 
values of democracy and good governance. Therefore, in some instances like that, the speed of 
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reward depends on different conditions other than the ones related to only trade, energy or 
environment policy areas. With all those indicator assessments in mind, the overall EU 






Trade Energy Environment 
Size Medium (2) Medium (2) Medium (2) 
Determinacy Strong (3) Strong (3) Strong (3) 
Credibility Medium (2) Medium (2) Medium (2) 
Overall  Medium (2.3) Medium (2.3) Medium (2.3) 
 
Table 6. Measurement of degree of EU Incentives in trade, energy and environment sectors 
(2016-2020). Author’s elaboration 
5.3 Commitment 
To assess the commitment of the Georgian side to adopt the EU rules and regulations and meet 
the undertaken commitments, this paper will analyze the number of EU instruments adopted 
and enforced as well as delayed implementation cases. Furthermore, qualitative assessment of 
each sector by the European Commission and European Parliament, Energy Community and 
Georgian parliament implementation reports, as well as evaluations by NGO’s will be used for 
the assessment of the variable. 
5.3.1 General overview 
Unlike provisions of the EU-Georgia  Partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) and ENP 
Action Plans signed previously, approximation clauses outlined in the EU-Georgia AA are of a 
binding nature. By signing the AA with the EU in 2014, Georgia committed to approximate its 
legislation with the EU acquis. According to the 2019-2020 Action Plan of The Parliament of 
Georgia,  Georgia is committed to approximate domestic legislation with at least 346 EU 
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directives, 213 EU regulations, 57 EU decisions and 31 EU recommendations. Half of the 
undertaken obligations, more specifically 128 directives, 56 regulations, 11 decisions and three 
recommendations, must have been fulfilled by the end of 2020 (Parliament of Georgia 2019, 
6). Georgian parliament measures the approximation process in 21 different sectors. Out of 
those 21 sectors, 11 are relevant to this study. (See Table 6) When analyzing given sectors in 
the Georgian Parliament data, the ones relevant to this study cover either one or two sectors 
from trade, energy, and/or environment (aa.ge). 
Sectors specific to this study Sectors from the data provided  by the Georgian Parliament 
Trade • Customs 
• Public Health 
• Rules applicable to postal and courier services 
• Rules applicable to financial services 
• Food safety 
• International maritime transport 
• Financial services 
• Telecommunications 
Energy • Energy 
Environment • Environment 
• Public Health 
• Climate Action 
• Energy 
Table 7. Sectors in which the approximation is measured by Georgian Parliament. Author’s 
elaboration (based on aa.ge) 
According to the Georgian Parliament's official data and the analyses of annual action plans of 
the Committee on European Integration - Parliament of Georgia,  the sectoral approximation 
of domestic legislation looks as follows. Out of the 11 sectors listed above, Georgia has adopted 
or enforced at least 21 directives, 55 regulations, two recommendations and ten decisions 
(aa.ge). Total of 88. The list of adopted or enforced obligations divided between three sectors 
looks as follows: Trade - 77 (enforced 33, adopted 44), Energy - 3 (enforced one adopted 2), 
Environment  - 10 (enforced 6, adopted 4). Many EU instruments regarding the energy and 
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environment sectors are specified in the Energy Community treaty. According to the data 
provided by the Committee on European Integration of Georgian Parliament, adoption is 
described as a stage at which the approximation of Georgian legislation with EU acquis is 
completed, but the norm is not enforced. On the other hand, in the case of enforced 
instruments, the approximation is completed, and the norm is in force (aa.ge).  
Further analyses of the action plans of the Committee on European Integration between 2018-
2021 showed that there were delays in the implementation and adoption of some rules from 
environment and trade policy areas. Namely, at least 9 of those obligations that had a deadline 
by 2020 were listed in the newer action plan with a new deadline according to the 
abovementioned action plan. Therefore, it can be assumed that previous deadlines have not 
been met. 
5.3.2 Commitments in the trade sector 
Firstly, the overall assessment by the European Commission and the European Parliament of 
Georgian progress in the trade policy area starting from 2016 has been positive (European 
Commission 2016a; 2017a; 2019; 2020a; 2021). Even before the AA fully entered into force, the 
Georgian side had demonstrated commitment to approximate domestic legislation with the EU 
acquis. For example, before 2016, Georgia has improved market surveillance, the National Food 
Agency (NFA) has more than doubled its control operations regarding sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures. It started working towards legislative approximation with the new EU 
Customs Code, entered in 2019 (European Commission 2019). Georgia has also progressed in 
applying the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean system of preferential rules of origin and the rules such 
as the Authorised Economic Operators (AEO) (European Commission 2017a, 1). 
More progress was made in the following years when the Georgian National Food Agency 
became a member of the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation (EPPO), 
which led to the improvement of the NFA phytosanitary control programme (ibid, 7). As a 
result, the European Commission listed additional Georgian products such as Black Sea fishery, 
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honey and raw wool as eligible for export to the EU market. According to the latest data, 
Georgia has been working on approximation and implementation of 272 EU agri-food legal 
instruments since 2010, with the deadline set to 2027. As of 2019, Georgia had approximated 
101 standards. This number reached 169 by 2020 (European Commission 2020a, 13; 2021, 13). 
Georgia has advanced by approximating legislation regarding intellectual property rights by 
preparing and drafting amendments in Georgian IPR legislation, which was adopted in the 
following year. By 2020 Georgia has reformed Georgian intellectual property laws in line with 
the AA (European Commission 2019, 3). 
Regarding the technical trade barriers, the recent data shows that Georgia has adopted 16,000 
standards, out of which 8,000 represent European ones (European Commission 2021, 13). Latest 
progress in the trade-policy area includes the Georgian Accreditation Centre (GAC) becoming 
the signatory to the European Accreditation Bilateral Agreement and gaining international 
recognition, the finalisation of the Food Safety Strategic Implementation Plan of the 
Agricultural and Rural Development Strategy of Georgia 2021-2027, joining the Common 
Transit Convention (CTC) by the Georgian Revenue Services (GRS), amendment of the Law of 
Georgia on Competition (European Commission 2017a, 7; 2021, 14; Georgian National 
Competition Agency 2020). 
Moreover, AFET commissioned expert studies that concluded that some of the DCFTA 
approximation procedures required by the AA are ahead of the schedules. Georgia had a head-
start compared to other DCFTA states regarding trade liberalisation as it scrapped most of the 
tariffs even before signing the agreement (Zygierewicz 2020, 32). It also went further by 
making free trade agreements with Hong Kong and China and currency negotiating with India. 
Georgia wants to establish itself as a bridge between the EU and the Asian markets. Although 
this goal is still far from being accomplished, the policy prerequisites are being put into place 
(ibid). The national exhaustion regime regarding the trademarks still does not comply with the 
provisions of the DCFTA (European Commission 2021, 14). Moreover, the legal framework on 
the protection and quality control system of Geographical Indicators in compliance with the 
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EU legislation, which should have been revised, is being delayed. Assessment by the European 
Commission has been relatively sceptical with regards to public procurement. Although the 
Government and State Procurement Agency (SPA) continues to provide the alignment of the 
legislation, as of 2020, the roadmap developed in 2017 is still on phase one out of five, with the 
deadline for all phases being until 2022 (European Commission 2017a; 2021). Also, the 
Commission concluded that actions approved by the Parliament of Georgia in 2017, such as 
creating a new review body with representatives of different governmental and non-
governmental entities, “does not comply with the requirements to set up an independent and 
impartial review body as set out in the DCFTA” (European Commission 2019, 9).  
However, the Georgian parliament made amendments based on which the new independent 
and impartial body will soon be established as required by the DCFTA (European Commission 
2021, 14). The recent legislation on public-private partnership (PPP) also received criticism as 
not complying with the relevant EU legislation in the field. Namely, with the Directive 
2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts. 
5.3.3 Commitments in the energy and environment sectors 
One of the key events in Georgia's energy and environment policy areas was becoming a 
Contracting Party to the Energy Community on 1 July 2017 (Energy Community n.d.). The 
protocol of accession to the Community provided a timeframe for implementing important 
energy market reforms under the AA (European Commission 2017a). 
Energy Community annual implementation reports provide specific data on the transposition 
performance of Georgia. The data covers all the sectors of the Energy Community, which, 
concerning this research, includes both energy and environment. When looking at the overall 
summary of both the energy and environment sector between 2018 and 2020, Georgia has 




Firstly, Georgia has improved its implementation performance from 23% according to the 2018  
Report, which is the first report that included Georgia, to 36%  in 2020 (Energy Community 
Secretariat 2018, 63; 2020, 62). This is the most significant increase in the last three years by 
any other contracting party, except for Ukraine that also scored over a 12% increase in 2020.  
Secondly, Energy Community reports assess the transposition degree varying from complete to 
partial and no transposition progress. According to the data, Georgia excelled in the 
transposition of the energy and environment-related legislation similar to the implementation 
performance. Namely, if in 2018 Georgia had no transposition progress in 41% of the selected 
indicators, which are under the AA and Energy Community Treaty obligations, the number 
was reduced to 38% and 14% in 2019 and 2020, respectively. The degree of partial 
transpositions has also decreased from 49% in 2018 to 39% in 2020. This was due to a notable 
increase in full or significant progress, which, according to the latest data, reached 44% 
compared to 16% and 11% in the previous two years (ibid). 
Figure 4. Energy Community Treaty Transposition Assessment (2018-2020). Author’s 





Countries’ summary implementation by the Energy Community provides valuable insight on 
the implementation status of energy and environmental acquis. Reports use several sector-
specific indicators for the assessment such as electricity, gas, oil, renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, environment, climate, infrastructure, statistics and cybersecurity, with the latest 
being added in 2020 for the first time in case of Georgia (Energy Community Secretariat 2018; 
2019; 2020). To adjust those indicators to the policy areas relevant to this paper, environment 
and climate indicators will evaluate the environment sector. The other indicators will be used 
to assess implementation and transposition in the energy sector. 
The analyses showed that the progress is being unevenly distributed even within individual 
sectors. Starting with the energy sector, implementing the energy acquis in gas, oil and 
infrastructure sectors is yet, to begin with, implementation status in those sectors varying from 
13% in the gas to 20% and 3% in oil and infrastructure, respectively. Overall, the 
implementation status in the infrastructure is the lowest among all the sectors. On the other 
hand, the implementation in the renewable energy sector and cybersecurity are still at an early 
stage. With renewable energy being implemented at 33% and cybersecurity at 29%. More 
advanced sectors in the energy policy area include electricity - 52%, energy efficiency, 44% 
and statistics - 99%, with the implementation process in the latter being almost completed 
(Energy Community Secretariat 2020, 62). 
We can see that the implementation was unevenly distributed between the different sectors 
within the energy policy area. While Georgia has almost finished implementing legislation 
related to the statistics, it's still lagging in the infrastructure and gas sectors. Therefore, energy 





Figure 5. Energy Implementation Summary (2018-2020). Author’s elaboration (based on the 
Annual Implementation Report Energy Community (2018, 2019, 2020))1 
Moving to other important evaluation mechanisms, the annual reports by the European 
Commission have given a moderate assessment to Georgia in the energy sector. The main 
criticism has been the lack of an energy efficiency policy framework in 2017, which has been 
a repeating remark in future implementation reports (European Commission 2017a, 13). 
Followed by the criticism from the  European Parliament and urging Georgian authorities to 
develop a national energy strategy that would reduce the level of energy subsidies and improve 
the country's position in energy security and energy independence (European Parliament 
2018). Moreover, according to the 2020 report, Georgia missed the critical deadlines for 
implementing energy acquis under the AA and the Energy Community Treaty (European 
 
 
1  Author was not able to determine why exactly some of the sectors, such as electricity, renewable energy, oil and 
infrastructure had lower implementation either 2019 or 2020 compared to the previous year. This could have been due 
to the change criterias in assessment such as assessment indicators and/or dynamic approximation when the number 
of legislations the country has to align to changes over time. 
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Parliament 2020). However, there have been positive sides as well in the assessment reports. 
Namely, the promotion of the construction of the new hydropower infrastructure and 
expanding Georgia's renewable energy mix (European Commission 2017a, 13). Adoption of the 
Energy and Water Supply Law and the Renewable Energy Law in 2019, laying the basis for the 
implementation of energy efficiency policies by adopting the Energy Efficiency and the Energy 
Performance of Buildings Law in May 2020, has also deserved a positive assessment by the 
Commission (European Commission 2019, 13). 
Increased energy supply security is one of the deliverables for 2020. The analyses of "Georgia's 
Implementation of 20 Eastern Partnership Deliverables for 2020" demonstrated that several 
projects that Georgia is involved in the energy sector had received criticism. (Lebanidze et al. 
2020, 78). Namely, planned rehabilitation of the hydropower plant Vardnili 2,3 and 4 with  
EUR 94 million, according to the report, has questionable consequences due to them being 
located in the occupied territory of Abkhazia (ibid, 83). Experts assess this as a potential for 
Russia to increase leverage over Georgia (ibid). Another project that, according to the expert 
opinion, requires comprehensive investigation as there are elements of corruption or at least 
neglect of public interest is the  HPP Shuakhevi which was funded by the EBRD and Asian 
Development Bank and International Finance Corporation. Firstly, the project received 
criticism due to environmental problems. The sceptical attitude was elevated due to the major 
tunnel failure that required an additional US 300 million investment on top of the initial USD 
400 million (ibid). This financial damage was passed on to the Georgian citizens without 
investor responsibility and public disclosure. Cases like these that address EU funded projects 
that have questionable consequences, low level of transparency and accountability raises 
questions regarding the overall commitment of the country to utilize the funding it receives 
from the EU in the most efficient way possible and increase the awareness in public about the 
costly failures as described above. 
Georgia 2020 Energy Policy Review by the International Energy Agency (IEA) matches the 
overall rhetoric of the EU commissioned implementation reports and reports on implementing 
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20 Deliverables regarding Georgia's commitments in the energy sector. Georgia's energy 
security situation has improved in recent years as the country is importing natural gas, which 
is Georgia's primary energy source, from Azerbaijan rather than Russia (International Energy 
Agency 2020, 14). However, energy security is still questionable. The Georgian Oil and Gas 
Cooperation report concluded that the risks and threats to the country's natural gas sector are 
high as infrastructure failures and the lack of strategic fuel reserves could lead to undesirable 
results (ibid, 43). 
Additionally, the latest reports show that due to slow progress up until this point, some of the 
future deadlines most likely will not be met. Namely, the obligation to maintain minimum 
stocks of crude and/or petroleum products is the EU acquis's requirement (ibid, 14). However, 
the Georgian side demonstrated a commitment to align the domestic energy sector with EU 
regulations by drafting primary legislation and developing secondary legislation with IFIs and 
various donors (ibid, 33). 
As data illustrates, Georgia has advanced in both environment and climate sectors of the energy 
community over the past three years, with an overall implementation increase from 27% in 
2018 to 35% in 2019 and eventually reaching 48% in 2020, according to the latest available 
data. 
The overall assessment of the progress in the environment sector according to the annual 
implementation reports commissioned and/or prepared by the EU has been positive. Georgia 
has progressed in the legal approximation under the AA. In the first couple of years after 
signing the Agreement, Georgia adopted a number of policy papers and laws in the sector, such 
as a new Waste Management Code, a Waste Management Strategy and new rules on the export 





Figure 6. Environment implementation summary (2018-2020). Author’s elaboration (based on 
the Annual Implementation Report Energy Community (2018, 2019, 2020)) 
Later in 2018, Georgia adopted its 3rd National Environment Action Programme (2017-2020), 
which is the main strategic document in the field of environment (European Commission 2019, 
15). Important legislation adopted in recent years includes the Law on Ambient Quality 
Protection, gradual implementation of the concept of Extended Producer Responsibility and 
adoption of the new Forest Code of Georgia (European Commission 2021, 15). Specific sectors 
within the environment and climate action have advanced more than the others. Advanced 
sectors include waste management, which has received adequate resources for expansion and 
modernisation in recent years. Moreover, Georgia has been receiving crucial technical 
assistance for the implementation of municipal plans.  
The country has been working on improving the capacity for enforcement, which remains one 
of the weaker links in different sectors, including the environmental policy area (European 
Commission 2019, 15; Lebanidze et al. 2020, 90). However, specific necessary steps still have 
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to be made, such as the adoption of the long-term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development 
Strategy (LEDS) and its new nationally determined contribution (NCD), which are required 
under the Paris Agreement (European Commission 2021, 15). 24 out of 50 Georgian 
municipalities have joined the Covenant of Mayor's initiative (COM).  Ten cities have already 
submitted sustainable energy action plans (SEAPs) and committed to cut the CO2 emission by 
20% by 2020.  However, since the development of the SEAPs, there has been little to no 
progress by those cities in monitoring the implementation (Lebanidze et al. 2020, 84). 
Energy Community implementation reports provide a more comprehensive assessment of 
transposition and implementation of the EU acquis in the environmental policy area. Main 
indicators for the environment sector outlined in the reports include Environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) and strategic environmental assessment (SEA), sulphur in fuels, large 
combustions plants and industrial emissions, nature protection,  national energy and climate 
plans  (NECPs) as well as National greenhouse gas emissions monitoring and reporting systems. 
Detailed analyses of the reports between 2017 and 2020 demonstrated that Georgian 
commitment has been moderate. On the one hand, it excelled in certain aspects of the sector 
while falling behind and not meeting deadlines in the others (Energy Community Secretariat 
2020, 62). For example, the Environmental Assessment Code and secondary legislation related 
to the code comply with the provisions of the directives on environmental impact assessment 
and strategic environmental assessment (Energy Community Secretariat 2020, 74). However, 
Georgia has not yet transported the provisions of any of the Directives related to the abatement 
of emissions from large combustion plants, and the country also missed the deadline for the 
transposition of Article 4(2) of the Wild Birds Directive, which was on 1 September 2019 (ibid, 
73). None of the above-mentioned delays is considered enough to invoke the dispute resolution 
mechanisms included in the AA and Energy Community Treaty. According to the latest data, 
Georgia, together with Montenegro and North Macedonia, are the only three contracting 




To conclude this subchapter, Georgian commitments will be assessed as medium. Although 
Georgia has advanced in all three sectors in adopting and implementing rules and received 
overall positive assessment according to multiple reports, the adoption and implementation 
degree within different aspects of individual sectors remain uneven. The analysis of the trade 
sector showed that the alignment with the acquis according to the DCFTA part of the AA is 
mostly going according to the schedule. However, Georgia missed several key deadlines 
regarding the number of directives and regulations as described above. Similar patterns can be 
observed in both energy and environmental policy. Although compared to other members of 
the Energy Community performance of Georgia might not strike as outstanding, it is the last 
member to join the community in 2017 that should be considered. The energy community 
assessed the transposition performance of Georgia as 44% fully or significantly implemented 
with no transposition progress in just 17% of the indicators (Energy Community Secretariat 
2020). However, missed deadlines, problems with implementation degree, and questionable 
projects have been outlined in the implementation reports by the European Commission, 
European Parliament, and independent NGOs. Overall, although differences between the 
sectors and chosen indicators have been described above, none of them goes beyond the 
medium range of assessment as described in the methodology chapter. Therefore, with all those 





Indicators Trade Energy Environment 
Rule Adoption Assessment Medium (2) Medium (2) Medium (2) 
Rule Implementation 
Assessment 
Medium (2) Medium (2) Medium (2) 
Overall  Medium (2) Medium (2) Medium (2) 
Table 8. Measurement of Georgian commitment in trade, energy and environment sectors 
(2016-2020). Author’s elaboration. 
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5.4 Domestic Adoption Costs 
5.4.1 Veto Players 
According to Freedom Barometer (n.d.), influential individuals, business interests and religious 
groups often intervene in a country's political processes. "Close ties between business and 
political elites in the country have significant influence over decision-making as well, itself 
thus often serving rather for personal or group benefits than for public interest "- says the latest 
report by the Freedom Barometer. Bidzina Ivanishvili, a former prime minister, the richest 
man and the only billionaire in Georgia, has been named the most prominent and influential 
person on the Georgian political scene in several researches and interviewees (Transparency 
International 2020; Loladze 2021). For example, according to the recent research by 
Transparency International (Transparency International 2020, 1), "Ivanishvili has successfully 
managed to place key Georgian public institutions, including ones supposed to be independent 
by law, in the service of his private business interests and security". The same report concluded 
that the signs of state capture by Ivanishvili are evident in all three branches of government in 
Georgia. According to Loladze (2021), it is clear that although Ivanishvili formally left the 
position as the chairman of the ruling party in January 2021, he still keeps control over the 
important decisions in the country.  
Margvelashvili (2021) expressed his concerns in the interview that the energy sector in general, 
more than most other ones, is famous for falling under the influence of business elites, and 
Georgia is no exception in that regard. However, due to much narrow circle of influence and 
all other veto players having connections with the government, compared to, for example, 
Ukraine, where there is a conflict of interest, most of the activities in individual sectors are 
hard to expose and remain undetected. 
Nevertheless, the case of Ivanishvili's cousin, Ucha Mamatsashvili, has come under the 
spotlight recently when it has been revealed that his company plays a role of a third party 
between Georgia and Azerbaijan when trading electricity. The company receives around $9 
million annually (report.ge 2020; Loladze 2021). Yet another large-scale scheme that addresses 
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the environmental sector is regarding Georgian Manganese, which is the largest producer and 
exporter of ferroalloys and manganese ore in Georgia. In 2017, the foreign owner of the 
company had deprived of the right to run the company by the Georgian government due to 
the damage caused to the environment of roughly $131 million. According to Georgian law, in 
similar cases, the state has a right to appoint a special manager instead of the previous owner.  
Local environmental organisations such as "Green Alternative" are concerned with the case 
because even in 2020, there have been no changes in how the Manganese is being extracted. 
Furthermore, a recent investigation by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2021) found close 
links between the business group involved in the Georgian Manganese and the ruling Georgian 
Dream party. Alongside unofficial links, newly elected management of the Georgian 
Manganese has donated over $157 million to Georgian Dream and political figures connected 
with it (ibid). 
Moreover, instead of the $131 million fine, Georgian Manganese paid only 5% of that to the 
state budget, according to Radio Liberty. Therefore, on one side, we have business and political 
elites benefiting from the current state of the Georgian Manganese. On the other side, we have 
damaged the reputation of the Georgian state for firing the foreign investor without a 
comprehensive investigation of the matter. At the same time, still nothing is being done to 
address the environmental side of the case. 
Because of the power and wealth imbalance in favour of Ivanishvili, Loladze (2021) outlines 
public officials on a local level, such as representatives of municipal governments who have 
been in office during the previous and current ruling parties, that can be characterised as a veto 
player due to their power of influence. But, Loladze (2021) further explains that due to their 
limited influence outside of their region and especially on a national level, their direct contact 
with the implementation of any AA commitments has not been identified. Nevertheless, such 
precedents, together with the case of Mamatsashvili or the Georgian Manganese, make progress 
in good governance elements - transparency, responsibility, and accountability questionable. 
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When talking about veto players in Georgia, it's important to mention the case of the Anaklia 
deep-sea port that was expected to be a key hub for East-West trade. However, after a possible 
intervention from an unconstitutional veto player, the project faced unforeseen consequences. 
The US, one of the closest allies to Georgia and the EU, was highly interested in the project. 
The principal investor in the Anaklia Port Project was the Anaklia Development Consortium 
(ADC)  which included one Georgian,  three US, one UK and three EU companies. Moreover, 
the Georgian government invested $100 million in the project (Hess and Otarashvili 2020, 4). 
However, starting from 2018, the position of the Georgian government towards the Anaklia 
project started to change. Georgian prime minister at that time, Giorgi Kvirikashvili, who was 
openly supporting the project, resigned after a committee meeting shortly after Ivanishvili 
officially returned to politics as the chairman of his ruling party. Since then, members of the 
ruling party who have left the Georgian Dream have talked about the aforementioned 
committee meeting. "There was a very critical and negative attitude towards the project, 
particularly towards the head of the consortium, Mamuka Khazaradze. This was apparent also 
in the aftermath of that meeting," - said Eka Beselia, a former Georgian Dream member and a 
lawmaker (netgazeti.ge 2019). It's noteworthy that Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze 
are the founders of TBC Holding, the only Georgian company in the ADC. In 2016, shortly 
after the ADC was awarded the contract for the Anaklia deep-sea port project, Khazaradze 
purchased a bank partially owned by Ivanishvili and Kakha Kaladze, the mayor of Tbilisi. 
Despite the Anaklia deep-sea port being of crucial importance for Georgia both in terms of 
security and economic development, Khazaradze claimed that in 2017 during a personal 
conversation with Ivanishvili, the billionaire told him, "Let's leave Anaklia alone. You clearly 
don't understand geopolitics. What are the Americans doing in the Black Sea? I thought that a 
Chinese state company was supposed to be the investor, and now I don't see any prospects of 
that" (reginfo.ge 2018). Khazaradze remembers yet another personal meeting with Ivanishvili 
at his house, which was attended by Khazaradze, Ivanishvili, General Prosecutor, Irakli 
Shotadze and yet another businessman, Vano Chkhartishvili. Ivanishvili called the meeting to 
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settle a business dispute between Khazaradze and Chkhartishvili (Voice of America 2019). 
During the interview, Loladze (2021) said that informal meetings like that which are attended 
by the most influential people in the country and surprisingly by the General Prosecutor hint 
that important matters for the nation could be decided behind closed doors by the 
unconstitutional veto players. Moreover, Loladze claims that the events that unfolded in 
summer 2018 had signs of a politically motivated attack on certain individuals, namely 
Khazaradze and Japaridze. The general prosecutor's office launched an investigation into TBC 
bank on alleged money-laundering charges in 2007-2008. Loladze (ibid) argues that charges 
against one of the most important figures of the Anaklia Development Consortium made it 
"extremely difficult for the ADC to attract huge investments and carry out this mega project". 
Furthermore, a recent report by Transparency International (2021)  finds clear links between 
the ownership of the Poti Free Industrial Zone and the role of Ivanishvili and Chkhartishvili. 
Poti deep-sea port is yet another important project with clear links to Ivanishvili and the ruling 
Georgian Dream. Namely, members and their business partners of Pace Georgia LLC, a 
company responsible for the expansion of the Poti port, have made significant donations to the 
Georgian Dream and President Salome Zurabishvili during the presidential election elections. 
According to the TI, Anaklia deep-sea port would have been significantly better than the port 
in Poti even after the reconstruction regarding the total investment, depth of vessels received 
and the port annual cargo processing capacity (ibid). It's not surprising that the US had a special 
interest in the project. Mike Pompeo, former Secretary of State, said during his visit to Georgia 
in 2020 that: "I communicated our hope that Georgia completes the (Anaklia) port project. The 
project and others will enhance Georgia's relationship with free economies and prevent 
Georgia from falling prey to Russian or Chinese economic influence" (Anaklia Development 
Consortium 2020). However, despite the full support from the US and the EU, in January 2020, 
the Georgian government cancelled contracts with the ADC, and all construction stopped 
(Hess and Otarashvili 2020, 15). In sum, suspicious suspension of the project, which potentially 
would have been the single largest investment in the history of modern Georgia, by the 
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Georgian government,  raises questions. Especially keeping in mind the informal meetings and 
business interests of one of the richest people in Georgia with significant political power. 
During the interview, ENV_Gov (2021) said that the veto players are not characteristic of the 
environmental sector, as it is usually less politicised. She further stated that there were signs of 
the influence by the unconstitutional players in the management of natural resources, 
especially in regards to the mineral resources due to the economic benefit. Moreover, 
ENV_Gov (2021) clarified that most of the corruption cases in the environment sector are on 
a domestic level and directly don't address the AA commitments. The influence of 
unconstitutional players is mainly used to acquire special licenses or avoid specific regulations. 
There can be several explanations for why this is happening. For example, approximation of 
the legislation is a lengthy process, and either implementation mechanisms or full legal basis 
to ensure the effective functioning of newly adopted regulations are not in place. This is further 
confirmed in the report by Transparency International (2020, 3):" Even after several reform 
waves, the court administration remains in the hands of a small group of influential judges, 
which is commonly referred to as the 'clan'". 
5.4.2 Administrative Capacity 
The importance of administrative capacity in different sectors has been outlined in almost 
every AA and DCFTA implementation report on Georgia. Margvelashvili (2021) and Lebanidze 
(2021) stressed the importance of domestic factors such as the administrative capacity and the 
will of the Georgian government as the deciding factors when analyzing the degree of AA 
implementation. Georgia has been encouraged to assign highly skilled personnel for the 
activities related to implementing the Association Agenda (European Parliament 2018, 7). The 
Commission has been vocal about the significance of the effort from national authorities 
regarding the efficiency, accountability and capacity of the available resources to meet the 
commitments under the AA/DCFTA. Moreover, by looking at the assistance Georgia is getting 
from the EU in terms of financial and technical support, missions such as Twinning and 
Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX), as well as overall rhetoric in the 
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implementation reports, the EU  understand that the degree of commitments and influence of 
domestic adoption costs on the implementation level largely depends on the availability of 
external support to enhance the administrative capacity (European Commission 2019, 18; 
Zygierewicz 2020, 12). 
Lebanidze (2021) stated that Georgia started an approximation process with a headstart 
regarding administrative capacity as between 2003-2012,  the country significantly advanced 
in building important state institutions and improving administrative capacity compared to 
what it was in the 1990s. However, problems related to administrative capacity still exist. 
When analyzing numerous AA implementation reports and interview transcripts, the most 
frequent reasons behind the lack of administrative capacity were corruption, nepotism, 
qualification and lack of evidence-based policy (European Commission 2017a, 16; 2021, 13; 
European Parliament 2018, 3; Margvelashvili 2021). 
Although several factors determine the degree of administrative capacity within a country, 
corruption has been vital among them,  especially in developing countries (Ricciuti, Savoia, 
and Sen 2019, 976). However, it is hard to determine the level of corruption in individual 
sectors and how that affects the alignment with the EU acquis in them. Nevertheless, the 
country's overall position in the numerous corruption-related rankings can be a reliable 
indicator as anti-corruption mechanisms have nationwide implications and do not address only 
one sector.  Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranks over 180 
countries in the world "by their perceived levels of public sector corruption, as determined by 
expert assessments and opinion surveys". According to the data, Georgia's position has slightly 
improved in recent years. Namely, in 2014 Georgia held the 50th position in the world with 





Year Position Ranking 
2014 50 52 
2015 48 52 
2016 44 57 
2017 46 56 
2018 41 58 
2019 44 56 
2020 45 56 
Table 9. Georgian ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index (2014-2020). Author’s 
elaboration (based on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index). 
Another reliable source is Bertelsmann Transformation Index which analyzes transformation 
processes towards democracy and market economy. Among the criteria of the BTI that 
addresses administrative capacity includes (a) Basic Administration (b) Efficient use of assets, 
(c) Anti-corruption policy. Starting with basic administration, Georgian's position has not 
changed much since 2014 (BTI Transformation Index). It improved by one point from 6 to 7  
in 2018 and remained at that level. According to the BTI codebook, 7 points mean that "The 
state's administrative structures provide most basic public services throughout the country, but 
their operation is to some extent deficient (lack of resources, corruption inefficiency)". Moving 
to the efficient use of assets, Georgia's position also improved by 1 point in the last six years 
from 5 to 6, which means that the government makes efficient use of some of the available 
human, financial and organizational resources. However, it's not enough to assess it as an 
"efficient use of most resources". Lastly, Anti-corruption policies such as auditing of state 
spending, regulation of party financing, citizen and media access to information, accountability 
of officeholders including asset declarations, conflicts of interest rules, codes of conduct as well 
as transparent public procurement system have received a moderate 7 points which are once 
again 1 point improvement in the last six years, i.e. "the government is often successful in 
containing corruption. Most integrity mechanisms are in place, but some are functioning with 
limited effectiveness" (BTI Transformation Index). The results with all three indicators 
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resemble the rhetoric in the AA implementation reports prepared by the EU institutions and a 
slight improvement in corruption in recent years represented in the Corruption Perception 
Index. 
The next factor that the research will briefly touch upon is nepotism, a topic widely covered 
by Georgian media and numerous reports. Loladze (2021), an analyst at the Transparency 
International anti-corruption team, said that nepotism is an aspect of corruption that TI 
frequently faces while researching government organizations. The characteristic of the 
majority of large cases of nepotism is the affiliation with the ruling political party. Loladze 
further explained that people working in higher institutions directly working on the formal 
approximation of Georgian legislation are highly qualified. However, it is in the smaller 
government organizations, legal entities under the public law, where we see most cases of 
nepotism. Interestingly, these entities should be dealing with the day-to-day tasks of 
implementing approximated legislation and putting those legislations into practice rather than 
putting "tick" in after formally adopting these regulations and avoiding the challenging part of 
implementation (Lejava 2021). Lejava (2021) and Samushia  (2021), who have been directly 
involved in the AA negotiation process in the early 2010s, remember how the current Georgian 
government ignored the recommendations and the calculations made in some instances during 
the negotiation process for personal business gains. Samushia (2021) argues that there are cases 
when in the 2010s, during the numerous negotiation rounds, they got the approval to move 
the approximation of specific regulations as far in the future as possible as it would have been 
"a huge hit for Georgian economy and administrative capacity", however, Georgian Dream 
decided to adopt those EU instruments earlier than outlined in the schedule. Samushia and 
Levaja name two main reasons for that. Firstly, "by doing so, they look good in the eyes of the 
EU, as they are ahead of schedule", says Samushia. Secondly, people directly connected with 
the ruling party have a personal business interest in these regulations. As a result, Georgia gets 
new rules that are costly for the taxpayers and commitments that the country's administrative 
capacity can not cope with. 
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Moving to individual sectors, limited sectoral available data and the information extracted from 
the interview transcript gave similar results. Margvelashvili (2021) named administrative 
capacity as one of the main factors in the energy sector. According to him, Georgia formally 
adopts specific rules. However, the implementation of those rules and implications in real life 
is fully left for donor programmes. Therefore, even if there is an improvement in an 
administrative capacity, it takes place in the aforementioned donor programmes rather than in 
respective government structures. "The country is left with completely insufficient 
administrative resources to solve the problems related with the approximation of legislation" 
(Margvelashvili 2021). Margvelashvili further explained the additional problems caused by the 
lack of administrative capacity. Namely, the absence of evidence-based policies. The results of 
an insignificant number of research and scientific evidence backing government decisions are 
visible in policy developments in the energy sector or any other industry for that matter. Lejava 
(2021) and Samushia (2021) outline why programmes created to enhance the administrative 
capacity in individual sectors might not be as effective as expected. "Millions of euros are being 
spent on capacity building programmes in government agencies. However, people attending 
those programmes are learning things by heart rather than developing critical thinking towards 
offered regulations". ENV_Gov (2021) further clarified the problems with programmes 
addressing administrative capacity and qualification of the workforce on the example of the 
environment sector. "Those programmes are useful for those people who already have a 
significant amount of experience and knowledge in the sector. Training that lasts only a couple 
of weeks can not solve the problem of qualification and administrative capacity. I think it is 
impossible to achieve this only through those programmes". Furthermore, capacity is an 
essential topic in the Third National Environmental Action Programme of Georgia. It is 
mentioned multiple times that the "skills and experiences of the governmental staff, as well as 
other stakeholders involved in the development and implementation of the environmental 
policy and legislation, is crucial" (Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture of 
Georgia 2018, 22). Moreover, the need for additional administrative capacity is outlined in the 
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document's problems and priorities section of each significant environmental chapter, such as 
water management, ambient air protection, waste management, etc. (ibid). 
The lack of administrative capacity is noticeable when looking at the approximation of the 
legislation on the example of energy and environment sectors. For example, Georgia has 
advanced the alignment process in activities requiring more office work than technical 
procedures. As mentioned above, according to the Energy Community, transposition and 
implementation degree in statistics are highest. At the same time, indicators regarding different 
resources such as gas, oil or more technical areas like infrastructure remain considerably low 
(Energy Community Secretariat 2020). The interviewees have mentioned this tendency as a 
mistake country often makes on the way to Europeanization. They are formally adopting rules 
without considering further difficulties when trying to implement them due to a lack of 
administrative capacity (Lejava 2021; Samushia 2021). 
5.4.3 Summary 
To conclude, analyzing empirical data has demonstrated that it is hard to individually assess 
highly sensitive subjects of veto players and technicalities of administrative capacity. Certain 
degrees of veto players have been observed in each of the three sectors. However, it was often 
hard to find direct links with their influence and the Georgian commitment to approximate 
domestic legislation with the EU. Nevertheless, veto players in trade and energy sectors have 
received similar assessments - medium in the environment sector - weak. Interviewees often 
mentioned how the influence of veto players is higher in more politicized sectors with greater 
business interests. Therefore, this explains the difference between trade and energy on the one 
hand and the environment on the other.  
Moving to the administrative capacity, due to difficulties accessing the information on 
individual sectors, the research relied on expert interviews for sectoral analyses and several 
ranking systems for general analyses. As a result, administrative capacity has been assessed as 
medium in all three sectors. Overall rhetoric from the AA implementation reports as well as 
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expert interviews has been relatively similar. Problems in administrative capacity exist partly 
due to the complexity of the legislation that needs to be approximated. The other reasons that 
emerged during the analyses were the effectiveness of the capacity enhancing programs and 
decisions made by the ruling party. As a result, administrative capacity has been assessed as 
medium.  In sum, domestic adoption costs have been evaluated as medium in all three sectors, 





Trade Energy Environment 
Veto Players 2 (medium) 2 (medium) 3 (weak) 
Administrative 
Capacity 
2 (medium) 2 (medium) 2 (medium) 
Total 2 
(medium)   
2  (medium) 2.5 (medium) 
 
Table 10. Measurement of domestic adoption costs in trade, energy and environment sectors 
(2016-2020). Author’s elaboration 
5.5 External Influence 
5.5.1 Russian Leverage 
The economic leverage of Russia over Georgia can be measured using several indicators. As 
outlined in the methodology chapter, I will use the same indicators in relation to the EU and 
compare them with Russia.  
Between 2014 and 2019, trade between Georgia and the EU amounted on average 25.6% of 
total Georgian trade. The same indicator for Georgian-Russian trade was 9.6%. However, total 
trade in the USD between Georgia and Russia between 2014 and 2019 increased by 73%, when 
Georgia-EU trade saw only a 7% increase. Although the amount in USD of Georgian-EU trade 
is still twice the number of Georgian-Russian trade, there is a clear trend of increasing trade 




Figure 7. Share of the EU and Russian trade in total Georgian trade (2014-2019). Author’s 
elaboration (based on geostat.ge) 
Moving to the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), the EU has a significant advantage compared 
to Russia. Namely, in 2019 FDI from the EU countries accounted for 50% of total FDI in 
Georgia. For comparison, the share of Russian FDI was only 4%. The average share of EU FDI 
between 2014 and 2019 for the EU was 45%, Russian - 3.8%. 
 
Figure 8. Share of the EU and Russian FDI in the total FDI in Georgia (2014-2019).  Author’s 
elaboration (based on geostat.ge) 
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A similar pattern continues when comparing the EU and Russian FDI, specifically in the energy 
sector. The EU FDI in the Georgian energy sector has been significant between 2014 and 2019 
(geostat.ge). In 2019 the energy sector's FDI from the EU and Russia to Georgia accounted for 
about 34% and 1.2%  of the total FDI in the energy sector, respectively. The highest share of 
Russian FDI in energy during the past six years was 3% in 2017. On the other hand, the FDI 




Figure 9.  Share of the EU and Russian energy sector FDI in total Energy sector FDI in Georgia. 
Author’s elaboration (based on geostat.ge) 
 
 
1 In 2014 the share of EU FDI in the energy sector was above 100% because the FDI in general can be 
both positive and negative according to the methodology used by the Geostat.ge.  “The reasons for which 
could be:- Increase or reduction of equity/share capital;- Profit or loss of an enterprise;- Receiving or 
repaying a loan of nonresident direct investor;- Purchase of a share by nonresident from a resident 




However, when analyzing Russian leverage in the energy sector, we should consider Georgia 
as an energy importer country, and Russia is one of the countries Georgia is buying its energy 
resources from, which increases Russian leverage.  
Russia, together with Azerbaijan and Turkey, are major exporters of electricity to Georgia. In 
2020 35.4% of Georgian imported electricity was from Russia. However, the largest electricity 
importer for the past four years has been Azerbaijan. Georgia imported 82% of the electricity  
from Azerbaijan in 2018, 67.8% in 2019, and the lowest share in the past four years was 45.1% 
in 2020 (esco.ge). 
Figure 10. Share of electricity imports to Georgia by country (2014-2020). Author’s elaboration 
(based on ESCO) 
Moving to natural gas, up until 2005, Russia was the only provider of natural gas to Georgia. 
Since 2009 Azerbaijan became the major importer. Most of those imports come from direct 
imports and transit fee payments from the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). According to the 
latest available data, the Russian shares of imported natural gas to Georgia remains insignificant 




Figure 11. Georgia’s natural gas imports by entry point (2000-2018). Source: Georgia 2020 
Energy Policy Review by International Energy Agency 
 
Lastly, Georgia relies primarily on imports for refined oil products. Georgia imports oil products 
from Azerbaijan, Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Italy, Turkmenistan, etc. Although Russia, 
together with Azerbaijan and Romania, remain major exporters of oil products to Georgia, 
unlike electricity and gas imports, Georgia has substantial flexibility when dealing with 
potential supply distribution. 
 
Figure 12. Georgia’s Oil product imports by country (2013-2018). Source: Georgia 2020 Energy 
Policy Review by International Energy Agency 
89 
 
Overall, even considering the existing Russian-Georgian economic or energy relations, expert 
interviews confirmed that that type of leverage has little to no effect on actual legislation 
approximation even though other Russian companies own noticeable shares of companies 
operating in the energy sector. For example, Russian company Inter RAO owns 75T of "Telasi'' 
as well as thermal power station  "Mtkvari Energetic", "Khramhesi 1" and "Khramhesi 2. 
Moreover, several influential Russian citizens own important hydroelectric stations in Georgia, 
such as "Larsi hydroelectric station" and "Skurdidi hydroelectric station" (Gelashvili 2019). 
However,  Murman Margvelashvili (2021) stated no clear link between these ownerships and 
the undertaken obligations under the AA.   
Lastly, Russia has not been identified as an important player in the Georgia-EU relations in the 
environmental policy in any of the reports, academic articles or interview transcripts analyzed. 
The interviewee from The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture of Georgia 
explains this by the less politicized nature of the environmental sector, especially compared to 
the trade and energy sectors (ENV_Gov 2021). Moreover, the Russian factor is not considered 
when it comes to approximating legislation by adopting specific EU instruments as they are 
more technical and require sufficient administrative capacity rather than being a geopolitical 
matter that falls under the Russian sphere of interest. 
Furthermore, Georgia has not been part of a Russian-led international organization neither in 
general nor with a specific focus on trade, energy or environment between the 2013-2019 
period. Georgia previously was a member of CIS, a regional intergovernmental organization 
created by Russia in 1991. However, Georgia withdrew its membership after the Russo-
Georgian war in 2008 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2009). Therefore, as Lebanidze (2021) 
argues, Russia has no leverage to dictate its economic or political agenda in Georgia in a way 
that would contradict Georgian European aspiration and slow down the approximation process 




As empirical data demonstrated, although Russia is an important economic partner of Georgia 
and plays a role in the Georgian energy market, its share is modest compared to the EU.  For 
the past six years,  the EU accounted for  25.7% of total Georgian trade on average, while the 
same figure is 11% for Russia. Furthermore, expert interviews confirmed the assumption that 
the increase in Georgian-Russian trade between 2013-2019 is not a type of leverage that could 
negatively affect the approximation process and implementation of the DCFTA.  The gap is 
even greater for foreign direct investments. In 2019 the share of EU FDI in Georgia was 50% 
of the total FDI in Georgia, while the FDI from Russia accounted for only 4% of the total.  A 
similar pattern continues for the FDI, specifically in the energy sector, wherein in 2019, the 
FDI from the EU and Russia was 34,4% and 1.2%, respectively of a total FDI. The share of 
imported electricity and natural gas from Russia has also decreased over the past decade. This 
was largely due to the diversification of the energy market and the increased role of Azerbaijan 
and Turkey in the Georgian energy sector, which resulted in a significant decrease in 
dependency on Russia.  Lastly, no Russian interest has been identified in the environment 
sector.  
Therefore, Russian leverage in the trade and energy sectors have been measured as low and in 




Trade Energy Environment 
Russian Leverage Low (1) Low (1) None(0) 
 
Table 11. Measurement of degree of external influence in trade, energy and environment 




Empirical analyses gave the following results. Firstly, the size of rewards in all three sectors 
was medium because the highest reward promised to Georgia is access to the EU market rather 
than a membership perspective. Determinacy of the EU conditions was assessed as strong as 
the conditions Georgia needs to do are clearly outlined and updated regularly. The credibility 
of the rewards was determined as medium. The AA document has special instruments to 
withhold the rewards in case of non-compliance with the commitments. Moreover, important 
financial assistance that Georgia is getting from the EU can be cancelled not if Georgia refuses 
to fulfil the undertaken obligations but if Georgia does not meet the EU expectations in 
democracy and good governance. Therefore, the credibility of rewards has been assessed as 
medium for each sector. In sum, the EU is offering Georgia similar incentives in each of the 
three sectors and has received a medium score overall.  
Similarly to the EU  incentives, Georgian commitments have been evaluated as medium: the 
adoption and implementation degree within each sector remains uneven. Georgia missed 
several key deadlines in each sector and carried out some questionable projects. However, it 
has advanced in all three sectors addressed in this paper, and none of the delays in deadlines 
was severe enough to invoke any of the AA instruments.  
Additionally, the analyses of domestic adoption costs and factors like administrative capacity 
and veto players demonstrated that Georgia faces medium adoption costs when looking at those 
two indicators. Starting with veto players, data analyses and the interviews have illustrated 
that although there are domestic veto players in Georgia, they are mostly connected with one 
influential individual, Bidzina Ivanishvili. Moreover, the research could not determine a clear 
link between the influence of the veto players and the Georgian commitment to approximate 
domestic legislation with that of the EU. Their influence was even smaller in the environment 
sector. As the interviewees often mentioned, it is the less politicized sector of the three and 
therefore receives less attention from the veto players.  Moving to the administrative capacity, 
Georgia faces similar difficulties in that regard in all three sectors. Despite the significant 
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assistance from the EU to enhance the administrative capacity, it remains one of the major 
problems. However, due to the reforms carried out after the Rose Revolution, Georgia has built 
a certain number of state institutions. It can cope with the overwhelming number of technical 
procedures and administrative-heavy tasks. In sum, domestic adoption costs have been 
evaluated as medium. Slight differences between the sectors were not significant enough for 
the variable to be either high or low.  
Lastly, this chapter looked at Russian leverage as the external influence that potentially served 
as an obstacle for the EU’s external governance in Georgia. The analyses of empirical data 
demonstrated that Russia is an important economic partner of Georgia and plays its role in the 
Georgian energy market. However, the EU share in overall Georgian trade and FDI  both in 
general and on a sectoral level between 2016 and 2020 has been significantly larger. Moreover,  
Georgia has advanced in terms of the diversification of the energy market, which resulted in 
decreased dependency on Russia. Lastly, the environment sector is the only one out of three 
with no Russian interest and leverage identified when analyzing the data. Therefore, Russian 












This outcome-centric single case study aimed to analyse domestic, EU-related and external 
factors that could explain why, regardless absence of the membership conditionality, which is 
the highest incentive a country can receive from the EU, Georgia has advanced in 
approximating domestic legislation with that of the EU and received the status of a frontrunner 
in democracy development among the ENP countries. The study took a sector-specific 
approach and analysed trade, energy, and environment policy areas.  
The research introduced an external governance framework. Further analyses of analytical 
approaches demonstrated that choosing only one model would limit the scope of research. 
Therefore the paper utilised neo-institutionalist, power-based and domestic structure 
approaches. By doing so, the research addressed variables at a domestic as well as external level. 
The study specified variables such as Georgian commitment, EU incentives, domestic adoption 
costs, external influence and assessed them for each sector to answer the following research 
question: 
Q: Why is Georgia a successful example of good governance promotion among EaP without 
having the EU membership perspective? 
The study revealed that Georgia demonstrates an adequate degree of commitments on a sectoral 
level considering the incentives it is getting from the EU; namely, both commitments and 
incentives variables have been assessed as medium. Although there is no membership 
perspective, Georgia does not face high domestic adoption costs. Firstly, it has veto players, but 
their interests do not openly go against the Georgian European aspirations and legislative 
approximation. However, some of their actions feed the corruption and harm good governance 
principles in general. Secondly, although the administrative capacity remains the challenge, 
the EU supports Georgia financially and technically to overcome it. Interviewees outlined that 
strengthening administrative capacity is a lengthy process. Projects addressed to fix that don't 
always give the expected outcome. Nevertheless, without them, it would have been 
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questionable to get where Georgia is today. Lastly, at least on a sectoral level, Georgia faces 
little to no negative external influence from Russia, which is an important factor. Potentially, 
suppose Georgia wants to make the most out of the governance model. In that case, it needs to 
address domestic adoption costs to boost the commitments, especially now that Georgia 
prepares itself to officially apply for EU membership by 2024 (Lavrelashvili and Hecke 2021). 
The results are slightly different across the sectors. Namely, there is little evidence of veto 
players influencing environmental policies in Georgia, compared to medium for trade and 
energy sectors. Secondly, no Russian leverage has been detected in the environmental sector 
compared to low Russian leverage for the trade and energy policy areas. Interviewees 
confirmed the assumption that this was due to the less politicised nature of the environmental 
sector in Georgia compared to trade and energy. This further supports the argument by Lavenex 
(2011a, 947) that in the less politicised sectors, there are fewer hindering factors for the success 
of the governance model. 
The research, therefore, concludes that low external influence with the combination of 
medium EU incentives, Georgian commitment and domestic adoption costs can be considered 
as a deciding factor as to why, despite no membership conditionality, Georgia continues to be 
the successful example of the good governance promotion in the ENP region. More specifically, 
alternative external incentives and the significance of economic relations with Russia 
compared to that of the EU are not large enough to reduce Georgia's commitment in any of the 
sectors discussed in the paper.  
Research results have further implications on the general effectiveness of EU external 
governance and different modes of governance discussed in the theoretical chapter. Firstly, the 
external governance framework proved to be useful for analysing how the EU supports 
democratic reforms and projects EU rules and standards in Georgia.  This is especially true if 
we look at hierarchy, market and network modes of external governance. The research has 
shown that the EU is using all three modes to a certain degree. Although, as a non-EU member 
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or candidate country, the network is the primary mode for external governance in Georgia, it's 
not the only one detected during the analysis. Georgia has the obligations to approximate 
domestic legislation with that of the EU according to the AA, and further cooperation between 
the two sides and significant financial assistance through multiple channels depends on how 
well Georgia keeps up the promises. This and the close economic cooperation, which as the 
highest reward promised by the EU that should ultimately lead to access to the EU market, is 
clear evidence of hierarchy and market modes of governance alongside the network. 
Using variables characteristic to three theoretical explanations was a necessary decision. By 
utilising neo-institutionalist, power-based and domestic structure explanations, the conclusion 
of the thesis included domestic, EU-based and external dimensions, which otherwise could 
have been overlooked. Based on cross-dimensional analyses, the research detected similar value 
for EU and domestic-based factors such as size and determinacy of rewards, Georgian 
commitment and domestic adoption costs on the one hand. On the other hand, in the relatively 
less politicised sectors such as the environment, the role of veto players and Russian leverage 
was smaller than in energy and trade. Lastly, the relatively under-researched governance 
model has demonstrated its potential. Namely, it targeted the aspects of the EU-Georgia 
relations relevant to this paper: helped the research to keep the focus on the democratisation 
potential of the EU-Georgia relations while maintaining a sector-specific approach.  
Nevertheless, the research encompassed several limitations. First of all, 2016-2020 timeframe. 
Although the reasons behind choosing this specific timeframe have been described in the 
methodology chapter, it can be interesting to look at the good governance promotion in 
Georgia from the beginning of EU-Georgia relations and analyse how the influencing factors 
shifted over time. Secondly, the study was limited to only three sectors. It can be a useful 
approach for future researchers to extend the scope of their paper to other sectors in which 




Another thing that can be argued about the sector-specific approach is the risk of losing the 
broader picture when looking at individual policy areas. Although in sectors analysed in the 
paper, Russian influence has been determined as weak, this research did not look at other ways 
external actors can influence the overall process of Europeanization in Georgia, such as 
disinformation and effects that might have on public opinion, which consequently can affect 
government's actions beyond officially announced positions. This brings to yet another 
perspective for further research that looks at other external actors in the region. Primarily due 
to the growing role of some of them in particular sectors such as energy.  
Although it goes beyond the research timeframe and the sectoral approach, there have been 
interesting developments in Georgia at the end of 2020 and the first half of 2021. Namely, the 
parliamentary elections that "put tremendous strain on Georgian democracy" (Freedom House 
2021) escalated a political crisis in Georgia and resulted in an overall decline in Democracy 
Score (ibid).  Although, after an active involvement of the European Union, the situation 
stabilised, it gives rise to doubt about the effectiveness of the governance model on a larger 
scale and if the progress in individual sectors at all can be translated into overall progress in 
democracy and good governance (EU Neighbours 2021b).  
Furthermore, the selected theoretical framework and the variables did not cover domestic 
factors entirely. More analyses of the logic behind the government decisions regarding rule 
selection are needed for a better understanding of the reality, even on a sectoral level. It is too 
early to declare the governance model's superiority over the others with all those shortcomings 
in mind. Further cross-country and cross-sectoral analyses are required to determine whether 
the governance model gives similar results under different domestic conditions. 
Despite those limitations, the research demonstrated an interesting approach to the EU 
external governance on a sectoral level in one of the ENP countries. It has further contributed 
to the relatively new analytical governance model. Moreover, the thesis utilised several 
analytical approaches to capture different influencing factors within and beyond the EU-
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Georgia relations. The latter turned out to be a crucial factor, as comparing variables from 
several analytical approaches made it possible to see a larger picture and accordingly address 
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Appendix B: List of Interviewees 
No Name/Code 
name 
Position held relevant to the research Sector 
1 Bidzina 
Lebanidze 
Senior Policy Analyst at Georgian Institute of Politics. Postdoctoral 




At the time of the AA negotiations: Senior advisor of the Prime 
Minister of Georgia. During the AA negotiations, member of Georgian 
delegation. Head of the negotiating team  on Technical Barriers to 
Trade/TBT and Competition. 
Trade and 
Energy 
3 Natia Samushia At the time of the AA negotiations: Advisor of the Prime Minister of 




Director of the World Experience for Georgia (WEG). Mr. 
Margvelashvili is a member of international and Georgian 
Associations of Energy Engineers (AEE, GAEE), and Associate 
Member of the Georgian Energy Academy (GEA) Former 
international consultant of the European Commission and the 
International Energy Agency in post-socialist countries.  
Energy 
5 Kakhi Kenkadze Invited Soecialist at the Committee of Foreign Relations of the 
Parliament of Georgia. 
Fellow of the Wetherhead Center of International Affairs of the 
Harvard University 
Mix 
6 Giorgi Loladze Analyst of the Anti-corruption team at the Transparency 
International Georgia 
Mix 
7 ENV_Gov Middle-level manager at the International Relations and European 
Integration Department at The Ministry of Environmental Protection 
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